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 Abstract:  
This paper explains how the Islamic State grew rapidly, answering a question of “what is” the Islamic 
State? A review of existing literature on simulation modeling of insurgencies identifies several gaps, as 
existing theories of non-state actors and insurgencies are inadequate to explain ISIS’s performance. 
Additionally, there are few mathematical simulation models of insurgent behavior that can reproduce 
ISIS results. Finally, what models exist are not detailed enough either to conduct detailed experiments 
testing proposed explanations of ISIS, or evaluate policy responses aimed at containing or mitigating 
ISIS.  
The paper offers several contributions. First it proposes a dynamic hypothesis that the Islamic 
State (ISIS) is an emerging-state actor, a new form of actor that differs from traditional non-state actors 
and insurgencies. Propositions are constructed and presented as an overall theory of emerging-state actor 
behavior. These propositions are then simulated as experiments within a detailed model parameterized 
with conditions very similar to what ISIS faced in Iraq and Syria 2013. The model is then run from 
2013-2020, and experiment results confirm evidence of emerging-state actor behavior and allow 
refinement of model boundary assumptions. 
Second, an initial set of intervention policies are tested in a variety of conditions: best case, 
operationally constrained, isolated, combined, and at different timing intervals. Analysis of the results 
yields key dynamic insights. These insights aid policy makers in understanding the challenges posed by  
emerging state actors. 
Finally, the detailed simulation model used to test the propositions and policy analysis, including 
a novel approach to combat simulation with endogenous geospatial feedback, is provided in full detail in 
two Appendices. Appendix A provides a sector-by-sector view of model structure and equations. 
Appendix B provides more discussion, analysis and sources used to develop model structure, establish 
parameter values and determine equations for the simulation. Due to length and other considerations, 
Appendix B is available only upon request. The detailed simulation model can be used to refine non-
state actor theories (configured for insurgencies, emerging-state actors, or other scenarios). The model 
can be loaded with other scenarios to simulate other actors in other geospatial terrain: ISIS in Libya, 
Boko Haram in Nigeria, the returning Taliban in Afghanistan, etc. 
Keywords: ISIS, ISIL, DAESH, insurgency, conflict, security, non-state actor, emerging-state 
actor, combat simulator, geospatial, national security. 
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Introduction 
The rapid rise of ISIS and its staying power created great uncertainty in terms of regional 
stability. Although it’s predecessor Al-Queda in Iraq presented a strong threat via a traditional 
insurgency, ISIS appears to operate in an entirely different manner. In under two years ISIS managed to 
capture two-thirds of Iraq and a third of Syria. Even when confronted with a five-front war, including 
interventions by regional and global powers such as Iran, Russia, and the United States, ISIS shows 
remarkable staying power. Calling ISIS an insurgency is difficult because they operate openly. 
Likewise, explanations that ISIS is a messianic religious cult or some form of mafia discounts how ISIS 
actually governed and sought to establish civic institutions in territory it controls. So what is ISIS? How 
can it be contained or defeated? Does it represent a new form of conflict that is a threat to regional 
stability? Can the ISIS phenomena be replicated elsewhere?  
This paper proposes a hypothesis that ISIS represents a new form of conflict arising from an 
emerging-state actor. Emerging-state actors operate in fundamentally different modes than a traditional 
insurgency, and this difference helps explain the rapid growth of ISIS and why other insurgencies might 
shift to this mode of conflict. First, the problem of explaining ISIS’s growth is presented, followed by a 
review of relevant literature concerning the simulation modeling of insurgencies. Then the theory of 
emerging-state actors as it applies to ISIS is developed within the existing theories of insurgencies. The 
hypothesis of an emerging-state actor is then synthesized through a series of logical statements 
connected in a causal-loop diagram. Experiments are conducted on the hypothesis using a detailed 
system dynamics simulation (explained fully in Appendix B) to build confidence in the hypothesis. 
Incremental knowledge gained by the experiments is presented, followed by a conclusion summarizing 
the findings and presenting options for future development. Finally, intervention policies are analyzed. 
Individual “best-case” policies are evaluated against the baseline performance, followed by a discussion 
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of insights generated from these tests. Then the policies are tested in a combined portfolio and at 
different timing intervals. The paper finishes with a conclusion that summarizes the insights, discusses 
limitations, and identifies future opportunities for research such as creating a ‘flight-simulator’ version 
of the simulator for fuller policy analysis.  
Detailed Problem Description 
In 2003, approximately one year after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Al-Queda Iraq (AQI) emerged as 
a potent threat to stability operations. At its peak, AQI influenced a population of nearly one million 
Iraqis through both criminal activities (extortion, car thefts, kidnappings) and guerrilla activities 
(recruiting, intimidation, military attacks). However, AQI never governed openly in the territory it 
influenced. Instead AQI conducted a classical guerrilla insurgency via clandestine means avoiding direct 
exposure and confrontation with Coalition Forces.  
The strength of AQI peaked in 2006 before declining as the result of three circumstances: a troop 
surge of US Forces, a Suuni-Shia civil war that AQI helped spark, and the indigenous resistance to AQI 
growing out of the Anbar Awakening. From 2008-2012 the organization almost declined to the point of 
non-existence. 
However, in 2013 the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took control of Ar-Raqqah, a 
medium sized city in eastern Syria with an estimated 13,200 militants.1 In a departure from AQI 
practices, ISIS began actively governing Ar-Raqqah. This initiated a transition of the population from 
being controlled by coercive power to governed by legitimacy that will be expanded upon later. By late 
2014, ISIS had grown to between 50,000-80,000 militants strong, taken control of nearly thirty per cent 
of the territory in Syria and Iraq, and threatened regional stability.  This brief history is depicted 
quantitatively across key measures in Figure 1.  
                                                 
1 All size estimates for ISIS are taken from the Department of State. The Office of Website Management, “Country Reports 
on Terrorism.” The entity now known as the Islamic State first appears in Country Reports on Terrorism in 2004 under the 
name Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn. 
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Figure 1: AQI & ISIS Performance 2004-2014 
 
The rapid growth of ISIS represented by the final years in Figure 1 represents a problem in the 
study of insurgencies and how to contain them. How did ISIS grow so quickly between 2013 and 2014? 
Would that growth continue? Insurgencies by existing definitions operate clandestinely through the 
means of guerrilla warfare, their energy arising from local grievances. Often, the territory of an 
insurgency and at least nominal government control overlay one another. The insurgency may compete 
with the government, but it does not seek to expel it completely from the territory it operates in.  These 
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premises underpin much of the literature and corresponding simulations models which create both 
growth and behavior modes.  But ISIS does not operate from the same premise and thus its behavior 
modes differed significantly. At times ISIS operates openly, almost like a conventional army capturing 
territory, establishing sovereign control, and operating openly within their territory. How can this new 
kind of entity, whatever it is, be depicted in models that allow simulation to test theories to explain its 
rapid growth?  
Literature Review  
Although the literature on insurgencies is extensive, in 2009 Kilcullen argued that Cartesian or 
reductionist quantitative analysis to model insurgencies may not be the best approach, and instead 
complexity theory and systems theory approaches may be more practical. Furthermore, the existence of 
cross-country multi-polar flows of interaction between insurgencies means many classical counter-
insurgency theories focusing only on a binary conflict of an insurgent against the government may no 
longer apply.2 There are only a handful of quantitative system dynamic efforts dealing with insurgencies 
or irregular warfare in the manner described by Kilcullen. An early multi-polar examination of 
conditions that give rise to internal violence in developing economies was conducted by Khalid Saeed in 
1983. The paper analyzed how social and political factors determined long term growth. Instability in 
the form of dissidence and subversive activities were modeled, but not explicitly as a violent insurgency 
or with resources becoming controlled by the dissidents. 3 In 2010 Turnley et. al. specifically modeled 
an irregular warfare environment to provide a computational representation of the interdependence 
between kinetic and non-kinetic aspects of a battlefield. This approach focused not on individual actors 
but on groups representing different sets of socially constructed norms. Turnley’s model aggregates 
three groups: Foreign Fighters, Coalition (which may represent both foreign and domestic government 
                                                 
2 Kilcullen, David, Counterinsurgency.  
3 Saeedd, “Economic Growth and Political Instability in the Developing Countries: A System View.” 
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forces), and Local Population, and models the dynamics between them. The model highlights the 
interaction of latent structure as it is affected by kinetic activity, but Turnley does not model the 
organization of the insurgency itself as a key factor in the dynamics of how it operates. Also Turnley’s 
report explicitly makes clear terminology and frames of reference by incorporating U.S. military 
definitions––a practice adopted later in this paper.4   
In 2011 Anderson used actual data from the Anglo–Irish War of 1919-1921 to model insurgency 
and counterinsurgency theories indicating potential gaps in the theory when compared to simulation 
results. However Anderson specifically did not model financial funding, a key element in explaining 
ISIS’s behavior, nor the global linkages as described by Kilcullen. Finally, Anderson’s model is largely 
built on the theories and perspectives of Counterinsurgency (U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, also 
referred to as FM 3-24), which precedes the rise of ISIS as a force that can operates both openly and 
clandestinely. The focus on intelligence gathering implicitly indicates an insurgency operating in a 
guerrilla or unconventional manner, as the IRA did.  However, the IRA was never able to seize and hold 
territory with this approach and may not best represent the dynamics of an actor like ISIS which seizes 
territory to the exclusion of all other actors.5  
In 2013 Saeed et. al. developed a generic structure to model political conflict which could 
include insurgencies.6 Aimed at understanding the structure of a political economy consisting of three 
populations: farmers, bandits and soldiers (thus giving the name to the model) and the flow of members 
between these populations.  The model, like Turnley, focuses on decision-making and choices of the 
population rather than the explicit structure of how an insurgency like ISIS might operate. 
                                                 
4 Turnley et al., “COIN 2.0 Formulation.” 
5 Anderson Jr., Edward J., “Modeling Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies.” 
6 Saeed, Pavlov, Oleg V., and Skorinko, Jeanine, “Farmers, Bandits and Soldiers: A Generic System for Addressing Peace 
Agendas.” 
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In 2014 Aamir presented a paper on modeling terrorist organizations using existing system 
dynamic models of business entities. This approach was built off a basis of literature that indicated 
parallels between the managerial challenges of a business firm as being similar to those of terrorist 
organizations. This approach divided sectors into the “functions” of a terrorist or insurgent activity 
including Territory/Capital Management, Financial Resources, Population Support, Supply Management 
, Human Resources and Attacks & Agency (which determines the timing and frequency of insurgent 
attacks). However, except for Attacks & Agency the models Aamir used were from existing system 
dynamics literature on business models, built generically, rather than aiming to model the performance 
of any one insurgent group.7  
This paper seeks to build upon the work of this existing literature by proposing a dynamic 
hypothesis that ISIS represents a new form of insurgency created by an “emerging-state” actor. In this 
effort I will adopt Turnley’s approach of using U.S. military definition of terms, the aspects of modeling 
ISIS as a firm or state from Aamir, and pay close attention to the causal mechanisms (financing, 
recruiting, gaining equipment) that allows ISIS to operate and achieve its goals missing from the 
theoretical structure of Anderson and the generic structure of Saeed.   
My contribution to the literature lies in three main areas. The first is in establishing a series of 
propositions based on causal logic that together form the dynamic hypothesis that ISIS is an emerging-
state actor, a form of conflict that can be located in the continuum of military classifications and clearly 
distinguished from other forms of conflict. Second, the propositions of the dynamic hypothesis can be 
tested in simulation experiments to see whether they are valid within the context of the model 
boundaries or not, and validate those boundaries. Finally, I hope to contribute a richly detailed 
simulation model that can simulate the performance of either an emerging-state or insurgent actor, 
compare performance between the two as well as each against a set of intervention policies. The model 
                                                 
7 Aamir, “Applying Existing System Dynamics Business Formulations to Model Terror Organizations.” 
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contains a detailed combat simulator and can also be configured via scenarios that include ethno-social 
and geo-spatial data to model different environments and starting conditions. All of this serves as a 
platform for conducting a portfolio of policy tests to understand both the behavior of an emerging-state 
actor versus an insurgent non-state actor, but also to conduct policy tests on interventions against the 
actors.  
Hypothesis Development: What is ISIS? 
Developing a hypothesis that ISIS is an emerging-state actor first requires identifying the 
existing perspectives on terrorism, insurgencies and irregular warfare. Then locating ISIS within this 
constellation of non-state actors. Part of that effort involves making explicit the modeling boundaries 
and how the problem is being sliced. This section concludes with the proposed hypothesis of ISIS as an 
emerging state actor.8 
From a theoretical perspective the question “what is the Islamic State?” represents a challenge of 
definition. Part of the confusion arises when terms often do not distinguish between tactics used by a 
non-state actor and threat to the state by a non-state actor. The two figures below, Figure 2 and Figure 3, 
both represent continuums along axes. Beginning with “tactics,” a continuum of the methods of 
operations employed in furthering an agenda by non-state actors can be notionally established using 
terms and definitions from the U.S. Military. In Figure 2, at the left of the continuum, are non-state 
actors who seek to achieve their agenda through unconventional warfare defined as “…operating 
through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”9   
Unconventional Warfare Irregular Warfare
 
Figure 2: Tactics Continuum 
 
                                                 
8 Turnley, “Where Is the Method in the Madness? Questions for Systems Dynamics Modeling Teams.” 
9 “Joint Publication 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 261. 
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On the right side of the continuum are those non-state actors who further their agenda through a 
“…violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 
population(s),”10 the key distinction being to what extent the non-state actors are operating in a 
clandestine or more open fashion and seeking legitimacy over the local population. The continuum ends 
at irregular warfare excluding conventional full-spectrum operations and nuclear war as being beyond 
the reach of non-state actors.    
 
Terrorist
Insurgent
State-Like 
Actor
 
 
Figure 3: “Threat to the State” represents the extent to which the agenda of a non-state actor 
represents an existential threat to the survival and continuance of a state. Agendas which seek change in 
government policy, release of prisoners, or financial demands are fundamentally different from agendas 
with goals to remove or replace current leadership or violently overthrow the state itself. Kilcullen 
distinguishes between “terrorist” and “insurgent” based on the question of how much of a threat to the 
state does the non-state actor pose. He describes how in “Western popular culture the conception of 
terrorism became that of disembodied cells of radicalized, nihilistic individuals [who]…could not and 
did not tap into a mass base that drew its legitimacy from popular grievances, as traditional 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
Figure 3: Threat to the State 
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insurgents.”11  But many insurgencies, Kilcullen continues, especially those of the 21st Century, operate 
in a conflict where the insurgents “challenge the state by making it impossible for the government to 
perform its functions, or by usurping those functions—most commonly, local-level political legitimacy; 
the rule of law; monopoly on the use of force; taxation; control of movement; and regulation of the 
economy.”12 So insurgencies differ from terrorism in their intent of challenging the state, however most 
insurgencies still operate in a clandestine fashion. This is because an insurgency does not yet have a 
monopoly on the activities within the territory they occupy, so the non-state actor can neither operate 
nor govern openly. This territorial control leading to open-governing distinction is vital amongst the 
non-state actors. Once an insurgency has begun controlling a territory to the exclusion of any other force 
and begins establishing and enforcing law, commerce, and social activity, they have evolved to 
something more than an insurgency. In 2007 the United States military published the Joint Operating 
Concept on Irregular Warfare in order to guide future joint force commanders on a wide variety of types 
of irregular warfare. However, the Joint Operating Concept briefly treats this concept of insurgencies 
acting in sovereign fashion in a footnote “[s]tate-like adversaries refer to non-traditional adversaries that 
have evolved to the point of attaining state-like power, authority, and influence over a population” and 
later acknowledging that “these adaptive actors may possess some of the power of states and adopt state-
like structures.”13 This final definition allows the creation of a vertical continuum of the threat to the state. At 
the bottom, small groups of individuals pursue policy change but have little chance of disrupting state 
function, whereas an insurgency is beginning to not only threaten but to disrupt the governing of the state. 
Finally when an insurgency begins capturing territory and governing openly, they have become a state-like 
actor and perhaps the only difference remaining from a state-like actor and a state is international 
recognition.  
                                                 
11 Kilcullen, David, Counterinsurgency. Location 3123 
12 Ibid. Location 2529 
13 Olson, Mattis, and Mullen, IRREGULAR WARFARE: COUNTERING IRREGULAR THREATS JOINT OPERATING 
CONCEPT, 8 & 16. 
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   Using the defined horizontal and vertical axes, non-state actors can now be notionally plotted 
based on where they fall on both continuums. Further segmentation can be arrived at by illustratively 
separating the graph into four quadrants representing the four natural distinctions of a two-axis 
arrangement as: high-challenge to the state with unconventional means, high challenge to the state with 
irregular warfare means, low challenge to the state with unconventional means, and so on. Three 
quadrants are easily defined with existing terms.  
It’s worth noting that “Guerrilla Insurgencies” are not at the top of the “challenge to state” axis.  
It follows logically that meeting the definition of a state-like actor would require a guerrilla insurgency 
to abandon clandestine or underground methods and begin operating in the open abandoning the 
clandestine nature characteristic of unconventional warfare. As a guerrilla insurgency gains territory and 
begins actually governing, it shifts to the right upper quadrant currently named ‘Unknown Territory’. 
The actors who occupy this space are those who conduct irregular warfare and yet present a threat to the 
state of equal or higher magnitude than guerilla insurgencies. Defining the characteristics of this 
‘unknown territory’ quadrant occurs later. But first we must locate where ISIS falls within the four 
quadrants.  
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Locating ISIS in this construct requires understanding its history and shifting mode of operation. 
From 2003–2013 ISIS, in its previous incarnations, operated an insurgency in an unconventional style, 
maintaining clandestine networks and conducting attacks in a fashion that allowed them to hide within 
the population. Their agenda, however, was a challenge to both the coalition authority and the U.S.-
backed Iraqi government. Although they operated from within the local population and conducted 
criminal activities to gain revenue, they were never able to openly govern the population. With the 
capture of Ar-Rakkah in 2013 this mode shifted from clandestine to open insurgency. Because of this 
shift in approach and end goals, it is better to describe ISIS using a term inclusive of insurgencies but 
not limited to unconventional operations such as irregular warfare. ISIS no longer sought to just deny 
governmental functions to the states (Syria and Iraq), but through the seizure of territory and 
establishment of Shura Councils to create their own state. 
As ISIS set up courts of law, collected taxes, established government services, and enforced 
social norms the group clearly began operating as a “state-like” actor, and given its rise might be better 
termed “emerging-state” or “proto-state” actor. Indeed the qualities of an “emerging-state” actor well 
qualify the upper right portion of the previously established quadrant. Locating ISIS in this space along 
with illustratively placing other non-state actor groups, the graph now appears as:  
 
Figure 4: Non-State Actor Segmentation 
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Figure 5: Filled Non-State Actor Segmentation 
 
This structure now provides a shaping context for the discussion of “what is ISIS” and a point of 
alignment in the modeling effort: the amount of relevant population under some form of control by ISIS. 
From Turnley, two forms of control over a population are identified: population controlled by coercive 
power and population governed through legitimacy. Coercive power results from the exercise of 
“coercion and reward” and is “particularistic as it is support for a specific action or specific person, not 
for an institution or a system of government.” Coercive power is more resource intensive as it “requires 
the investment in individuals who can continuously monitor behavior and apply either positive or 
negative pressure to induce compliance whenever necessary.” 14 Legitimacy is a form of power that 
relies on the function of procedures that the governed population considers fair, and is established with 
credibility over time. Unlike coercive power used to ensure compliance, legitimacy “involves notions of 
obligation, i.e. the moral necessity to obey. Control by others is replaced by self-control, which socially 
is a much cheaper way to ensure social order.”15 Each institution created by the would-be governing 
                                                 
14 Turnley et al., COIN 2.0 Formulation, 37-38. 
15 Ibid., 38–40. 
C
h
a
ll
e
n
g
e
 t
o
 S
ta
te
State-Like Actor
Irregular Warfare
Terrorist
Tactics
Unconventional
Warfare
Terror Networks
Guerilla Insurgencies
Insurgent
Global Insurgency
Emerging State Actors
 PLO
 FARC
 IRA
 AQI
 Taliban 
‘01-’15
 Italian Red Brigade
 Red Army Faction
 Japanese Red Army
 Al Queda Global Network 
(e.g. Core AQ, AQIP, 
AQIM, AQAP, Al Nusra pre 
2015)
 The Islamic State
 Boko Haram?
 Taliban 1993-2001 & 2015?
 Al Nusra & AQAP 2015?
© Tim Clancy MAR 2015                               Contact: timothy.clancy.nv@gmail.com 17
power must itself create a variety of processes and procedures within which it exercises its duties.  Legal 
courts hold trials and settle disputes, civic institutions provide public services, and law enforcement 
services react to crime. It is the perception of the target population over whether these procedures are 
“fair,” relative to the norms of the target population that begin to establish credibility. Turnely 
emphasizes that credibility is “not event-based but process-based” and therefore legitimacy can only be 
gained through repetition of credible processes by considered “fair.” 16 Once gained, legitimacy serves 
as a buffer against individual renegade officials or short periods of procedural injustice. This is because 
the population “believe[s] that, over time, the system will punish or otherwise deal with them.”17  
Turnley illustrates the transitioning distribution of a percentage of population controlled through 
coercive power and the percentage governed through legitimacy with a diagram presented as Figure 6.  
Institutions are created at times t1, t2 & t3, each deploying a series of procedures to execute their 
purpose. As each procedure by an institution is considered “fair,” the amount of Power (coercive power) 
decreases as Legitimacy (governed through legitimacy) increases. Additionally, the succession of 
credible and fair institutions also decreases the amount of Power needed versus Legitimacy.  
                                                 
16 Ibid., 38. 
17 Ibid., 39. 
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Modeling Boundaries & Approach  
Prior to creating a simulation model, the proposed theory to be tested must be developed into a 
strong logical argument. In system dynamics these logical structures are made visual and explicit with 
causal loop diagrams (CLD) that distill into to a few key feedback loops of the hypothesis of what is 
generating the proposed behavior. From this, the detailed CLD simulation models of hundreds of 
equations can be constructed. However, since models can never truly represent reality, boundary 
selection must be made explicitly clear. For the proposed hypothesis that ISIS as an emerging-state actor 
reasonable boundaries can be selected through a “slicing approach” to complex systems as advocated by 
Saeed in 1992.18 In complex systems modes of behavior can be sliced across three axes as shown in 
                                                 
18 Saeed, Khalid, “Slicing a Complex Problem for System Dynamics Modeling.” 
Figure 6:  Power & Legitimacy 
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Figure 7: time, geography (both a geography of ‘terrain’ and a geography of ‘things’), and simultaneous 
behavior modes that exist within a complex system. 
 
 
In this paper the complex system will be sliced as depicted in Table 1. Additional commentary 
on these selections is provided in the Appendix B.  
Table 1: Proposed Slicing of Simulation Model 
Axis Slice Modeled Slice Not Modeled 
Mode Exponential growth of Governed Population Limits to Growth 
Time Duration = 2013-2017 
Unit = 6 months, dt = .0055 (or 1 day) 
Pre-2013 and greater than 5 year 
feedback loops 
Geography Territory: Iraq & Syria Provinces & Cities 
Ethno-Social Populations: Kurds, Shia & Suuni  
Forces: ISIS vs. Everyone Else 
Cross Regional Flows 
Tribal Structures 
Towns & Villages 
Policy 
Responses 
Exogenous Policies Latent Structure Policies 
Two modeling methods are used in this paper: non-simulatable Causal Loop Diagrams to create 
a visual depiction of the emerging-state actor theory, and a simulation model developed to test the 
hypothesis that ISIS is an emerging-state actor.  
Hypothesis Design through Causal Loop Analysis  
Existing causal loop structure for insurgencies in the literature is limited as discussed previously.  
Because the models used by Aamir were already extant, he did not provide an integrated causal loop 
Figure 7: Complex Problem Solving 
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structure.19 In their ‘Farmers, Bandits, and Soldiers’ model Saeed et. al. likewise did not depict a causal 
loop diagram.20  Only in Anderson’s paper was a causal loop diagram of his theoretical construct created, 
as depicted in Figure 8.21  
 
 
Anderson’s model is limited in its utility in examining ISIS and other emerging state actors using 
irregular warfare. This is because Anderson’s model is built on the premise that insurgents are fighting a 
“classic” insurgency following O’Neill’s definition that largely confines insurgents to operating in a 
guerrilla manner, e.g. “raids, ambushes, bombings, etc.”22 This is consistent with the Joint Forces 
definition of unconventional warfare of “operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and 
                                                 
19 Aamir, “Applying Existing System Dynamics Business Formulations to Model Terror Organizations,” 8. 
20 Saeed, Pavlov, Oleg V., and Skorinko, Jeanine, “Farmers, Bandits and Soldiers: A Generic System for Addressing Peace 
Agendas.” 
21 Anderson Jr., Edward J., “Modeling Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies,” 8. 
22 Ibid., 3. 
Figure 8: Anderson COIN CLD 
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guerrilla force in a denied area.”23 This does not comport with behavior that is state-like, or defined 
above as emerging-state behavior.   
Causal loop diagrams can demonstrate the differences between a traditional insurgency and 
emerging-state actors. From these differences manifests the theory of emerging-state actor behavior and 
performance. These differences can then be tested in the simulation model for validation against the 
hypothesis that ISIS is an emerging state actor. A notional “classic” insurgency causal loop diagram is 
depicted in Figure 9.  
Military Actions
Population controlled
through Coercive Power
Finances
Local Recruits
Militants
+
+
+
Criminal Revenues
+
+
+
Military Actions capture
Territory & Control
Population
Money funds increased
Military Action
+
Local Grievances
+
 
Figure 9: Notional CLD of a Classical Insurgency 
  
The classical logic of an begins with local grievances leading to an increase in militants willing to 
conduct violence against the state. The causes of local grievances are irrelevant for purposes of this 
paper. What is key is that positive polarity indicates that as local grievances increase, so do militants, 
and if local grievances were to decrease, militants and their actions would also decrease. This is 
illustrative of the importance of resolving local grievances, often through political reform, as a sustained 
                                                 
23 “Joint Publication 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 261. 
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approach to ending an insurgency over time.24 After that the non-state actor gains militants from local 
grievances, a feedback loop initiates, where they conduct military actions, which allow them to control a 
population through coercive power (intimidation). The insurgency then seeks to gain local recruits from 
the population by exploiting the local grievances, which increases the number of militants and allows 
them to conduct more military actions. The non-state insurgent actor funds its operations from criminal 
activities conducted within the territory they influence. These could be criminal activities targeting 
populations that are not aligned with the insurgents such as ransoms, extortion, reselling of stolen 
property, looting, and selling of blood-antiquities (stolen historical artifacts). Criminal activities also 
include activities which are illegal globally but may be tolerated locally such as the illegal drug trade.  
Finally, criminal revenues include informal taxation schemas that bear more resemblance to extortion 
than a formal state levied tax. These funds increase non-state insurgents finances, allowing them to 
support and pay more Militants. Both of these feedback loops increase the number of militants, which is 
how insurgencies gain their strength and staying power. Conversely, and logically, a sustained reduction 
in either local grievances through reconciliation, ability to gain finances, or reduction of militants 
through military action all hold the potential to reduce the feedback loop that powers the classic non-
state actor insurgent, especially when applied in combination. 
The difference between a non-state actor and emerging-state actor insurgencies lies almost 
wholly in the seizure of territory and its subsequent governing by the emerging-state actor as well as the 
exploitation of global grievances in addition to local. When we add this aspect to our existing CLD 
structure, three loops emerge: seizure of territory, control of population through legitimacy, and foreign 
recruiting by playing on global grievances. The larger CLD is depicted in Figure 10.   
                                                 
24 Kilcullen, David, Counterinsurgency, 6–7 location 173–199. 
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Figure 10: CLD of an Emerging State Actor 
 
The first difference with the emerging state actor CLD is the input of non-local grievances that 
bring foreign recruits to an area. These militants may be aligned to the local grievances at first, but a 
reduction in local grievances will not result in a reduction of foreign intervention since those grievances 
are non-local. The second difference is that military actions in this model are designed not only to terrify 
or intimidate populations, but also to seize territory. This territory then enables an additional feedback 
loop of “territorial tevenues” to be activated. Control of territory allows a non-state actor to control the 
resource extractions that occur in that territory. These territorial revenues require coordination of 
workers and leveraging infrastructure, and they are difficult to secure when an insurgency operates in a 
classical clandestine manner. In Afghanistan the Taliban took advantage of opium farming, while in 
Nigeria Boko Haram helps fund itself through oil in Columbia the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Columbia (FARC) exploited the production of cocaine. For ISIS, the territorial revenue is oil and to a 
lesser extent blood antiquities. These additional financial inputs produced from lucrative trade charge 
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the feedback loop that runs through finances to obtain more militants, conduct more military actions and 
thus gain more territory.   
Seizing territory opens another powerful feedback loop of enabling non-state actors to begin 
governing the population. This creates the processes by which coercive power shift to legitimate power. 
Populations controlled through legitimacy are less resource intensive to control, since the population 
“self-controls” and also allows taxation of normal commerce and individuals. The shift to Legitimacy 
also feeds back on itself. The more people governed through Legitimacy, the easier finances are 
collected through taxation, which fund local governance mechanisms. In ISIS’s case, taxation funds 
their Shura Councils. These local governance mechanisms can provide the services that only a sovereign 
state actor can provide: law enforcement, judicial proceedings, building infrastructure, social services, 
and other government services that may have been lacking in the area.  
Finally the entire system benefits from the non-local grievances that the emerging-state actor can 
leverage by drawing both recruits and individuals into its new government from abroad. The loss of 
local support is often a death-knell for classical insurgencies. But even if local support decreases, or 
shifts against the emerging-state actor the inflow of foreign militants and transplants mitigate the impact 
to the operations as will be shown in policy tests later in the paper.  
The emerging state actor theory can be summarized as:  
1. Local & non-local grievances bring militants and a non-state actor either emerges or is drawn 
into conflict.  
2. The non-state actor uses militants and finances to conduct military actions.  
3. As the non-state gains controlled population begins extracting coercive revenues through 
criminal activities and recruiting locally from within the controlled population. 
4. Within its territory, the non-state actor attempts to monopolize the use of force, taxation, control 
of movement, and regulation of the economy. By operating in a sovereign manner, the non-state 
actor shifts to an emerging state actor.  
5. Coercive revenues & territorial revenues are used to finance governing mechanisms which can 
begin building legitimacy to shift the controlled population into a governed population. 
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6. As the emerging-state actor gains a governed population, it also gains taxation revenue and 
increases its draw of non-local foreign recruits by propagandizing its non-local grievances, 
which may or may not align to local grievances.  
7. The loops complete into a positive feedback loop of exponential growth. More militants mean 
more military actions, which means more territory and access to controlled populations, which 
can begin to be governed, fueling finances, which fund more militants and military actions.  
The shift from a classic non-state actor insurgency to an emerging-state actor insurgency, in this 
hypothesis, occurs at step 4 and completes in step 5. This can be described in another way. For a non-
state actor to become an emerging state actor it must: 
1. Control territory to the exclusion of all other state actors. 
2. Seek to govern that territory in an open manner to build legitimacy.  
In the case of ISIS’s predecessor AQI, the group was able to reach step 3 and partially step 4. Even 
though AQI certainly influenced a population and extracted criminal revenues from them, AQI was 
never able to meet the two criteria above to complete the transition from 4 to 5.   
An astute reader might note that in this formulation, an emerging-state actor is self perpetuating, 
a foregone conclusion once militants enter the system. To complete the CLD in Figure 5, balancing 
loops are added representatives of various limits to growth. These are endogenous limits––externalities 
imposing limits on the emerging-state actor, but even with absent external pressure, some form of these 
limits can emerge over time. 
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Figure 11: Emerging State Actor with Balancing Loops 
The most immediate and pressing is the “Resistance & Uprising” loop. As ISIS controls more 
population, it requires more forces to garrison than population in order to prevent uprisings against their 
rule. This reduces the number of militants available to gain more territory. However, the force ratios (as 
discussed in the Appendix B) for garrisoning a population through coercive control are higher (ranging 
from 8:1 to as high as 55:1) than the ratios necessary to police a population (~2.8:1) governed through 
legitimacy. This speaks directly to a key benefit an emerging-state actor can gain over a non-state actor, 
as identified by Turnely et. al. Populations governed through legitimacy rather than coercive power are 
less resource intensive for the insurgency. Another negative feedback loop found in emerging-state 
actors is the “Descent into Factions.” Because the emerging-state actor draws its support from both local 
and global grievances, and its forces are a mix of natives and foreigners from many countries; there is 
not the shared common background found in a locally arisen insurgency. This lack of common 
© Tim Clancy MAR 2015                               Contact: timothy.clancy.nv@gmail.com 27
background exacerbates factionalism and can lead to splits within the forces as the size of the emerging-
state actor increases. This loop its precedence in ISIS’s own emergence within the Al-Queda global 
franchisee network, splitting in 2013. Growth and size of any entity may lead to disagreements over both 
policy and personality, and if those factions are significant enough, they may break the emerging state 
actor apart. The Dynastic Cycle begins with the corruption and abuse of arbitrary power available to a 
state, similar to that described by Katouzian’s theory of arbitrary state and society.25 These abuses erode 
governing by legitimacy, feeding both the Uprising & Resistance loop and the Descent into Factions oop. 
Note however that with the CLD proposed above, the decrease of governing by legitimacy does not 
itself result in a loss of population governed through legitimacy. This indicates only if one of the 
competing factions itself begins as an insurgency, a non-state or emerging-state actor can pry significant 
portions of the population away from the first actor. Finally, the negative feedback loops of Descent into 
Factions and the Dynastic Cycle have a significant delay function and therefore may develop well after 
emerging-state actor has established itself. As modeled by Langarudi, the Katouzian dynastic cycle can 
take decades to manifest.26 The Afghanistan Taliban, as an emerging-state actor for instance, maintained 
its governing legitimacy despite abuses until the post-9/11 U.S. invasion in 2001. For this reason in the 
attached simulation model, Dynastic Cycle and Descent into Faction feedback loops are not explicitly 
modeled as being outside the time horizon identified by the boundary assumptions. The impact of 
garrison forces however is modeled.  
Returning to AQI and its failure to transition from step 4 to step 5, the inability to govern 
legitimately and relying only on coercive and often abusive power, exposed AQI to blowback from local 
fighters beginning in the Anbar Awakening of 2006, which is an example of the activation of the 
Uprising & Resistance negative feedback loop. Coinciding with this was an increase in U.S. forces due 
                                                 
25 Langarudi and Radzicki, “A Simulation Model of Katouzian’s Theory of Arbitrary State and Society,” 7. 
26 Ibid., 10–16. 
© Tim Clancy MAR 2015                               Contact: timothy.clancy.nv@gmail.com 28
to the surge. These loops can therefore help explain not only the rise of ISIS in 2013, but the collapse of 
AQI forces in 2006–2007. A classical insurgent could not sustain itself in that environment. 
 
Hypothesis that ISIS is an Emerging State Actor 
Based on the previous theoretical development, I propose the following hypothesis: the Islamic State 
(ISIS) is an emerging-state actor, which uses methods of irregular warfare to capture territory in order to 
influence populations (“coercive power”), which it then attempts to govern in furtherance of its 
objective to become a functioning state (“legitimate power”). I recognize that although the term for this 
category might be new in this application, the behavior and model is not, as other actors, such as the 
Taliban in Afghanistan and Hamas in Hezbollah, took this route as indicated by the segmentation.  
 We can now create a simulation model of sufficient detailing to test the hypothesis that ISIS is an 
emerging-state actor, and indeed the theory itself. The model is created in two sections: a strategic 
architecture of ISIS, and a world model within which ISIS operates. The strategic architecture identifies 
the resources and capabilities that determine performance at any point in time. This performance-based 
approach to modeling recognizes that these resources accumulate or deplete driven by flow-rates and the 
changes in the resource. Sub-systems representing the constants, parameters, information flow, and 
leadership decisions, as well as the influence of other resource levels, all combine to affect the rates of 
change. Reinforcing and balancing feedback interactions between these resources can be used to explain 
the dynamics of strategic performance. This aggregate strategic architecture is depicted in Figure 13.  
© Tim Clancy MAR 2015                               Contact: timothy.clancy.nv@gmail.com 29
People Governed
through
Legitimacy
(People)
People Governed
through Coercive Power
(People)
Population
(People)Territory
ISIS
Controls
(km^2)
ISIS
Squads
(Squads)
Shura
Councils
(Councils)
ISIS
Finances
(Dollars)
AFV & IFV
(Pieces)
ISIS Militants
(People)
Militant
Experience
(Exp Years)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
+
SUPPLY
STOCKS
DEMAND
STOCKS
PRIMARY
OBJECTIVE
SECONDARY
OBJECTIVE
 
 
The demand stocks in the strategic architecture represent first and foremost the “target population” that 
the state and emerging-state actor are competing over, and important attributes of said population.  
Likewise the mechanisms by which insurgents gain access to the “target population” which requires 
establishing some form of governance are the demands that ISIS is trying to meet. In order to achieve 
these demands, ISIS will use supply-stocks representing its capabilities and capacity.   
Figure 12: ISIS Strategic Architecture 
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The ISIS strategic architecture is then located in a world model, as shown in Figure 14. The 
world model defines the “environment” within which subsystems interact with local conditions (where 
recruits and resources are located relative to what is controlled), competitors (who will resist expansion 
and what means are used), and even internal dynamics (how effectively revenue and expenses are 
managed) interact with the subsystems.  
The baseline scenario seeks to replicate the conditions in Syria and Iraq beginning in 2013 and 
the expansion of ISIS as an emerging state-actor. Notably the baseline scenario is absent the significant 
intervention of third parties through 2020. When simulated at baseline parameters, the model replicates 
closely––but not exactly––the exponential growth of ISIS and seizure of large amounts of territory 
through 2015. Geographic boundaries at this point in the baseline simulation depict ISIS stalling and 
failing to take the city of Allepo, yet still having a western border in Aleppo, including in Kobani. The 
outskirts of Homs mark its southwest border in Syria. From this border back through eastern Syria, ISIS 
has complete control over Deir e Zor province, Ar Raqqah province, the Ayn al-Arab sub-district and Al 
Hasakah province. To the east in Iraq ISIS controls all of Anbar, Ninawa, and Salah ad-Din, including 
Figure 13: World Model 
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the cities of Mosul, Ramadi, Fallujha, and Tikrit. To the north ISIS fails to take any of the Kirku 
province and is kept out of the major cities of Baghdad and Kirkuk. Clearly this does not reflect reality. 
ISIS never took and held Kobani, and with the intervention of numerous state-actors not modeled in the 
baseline, ISIS has already lost territory by mid-2016. The baseline simulation successfully replicates the 
behavior mode on which the dynamic hypothesis is based. Model simulations can be discussed 
quantitatively in a dashboard of key stocks in the model, as in Figure 15, in addition to a qualitative 
narrative that amplifies the understanding provided by the dashboard. 
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Figure 14: Baseline Dashboard of Performance 
 
The narrative of this dashboard portrays what is described in the causal feedback loops earlier. 
ISIS is able to grow exponentially for a time by seizing territory, gaining a population that it first rules 
with coercive power and then shifts to legitimate government. The gains in both finances and militants 
aids ISIS in gaining more territory. However, as ISIS draws from global grievances, an increasing 
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percentage of these militants are foreigners, exacerbating the problem of local opposition fighters who , 
in addition to Iraqi & Syrian forces, begin resisting ISIS’s rule. Over time this structure requires an 
increasing garrison and police force by ISIS to keep and maintain its holdings, which slows its ability to 
attack and gain new territory. This reaches an equilibrium point in the model at about 45% of all of Iraq 
and Syria (somewhere between Kobani and Aleppo in Syria and with most of Anbar in Iraq). There are 
nearly 8 million people underneath ISIS’s rule from a conflict that has created nearly 500,000 casualties 
and close to 4 million refugees. Most worrisome, ISIS is creating a free cash flow measured in the 
billions of dollars through the black market sales of oil. Although the model does not account for where 
this surplus is used, it’s clear that ISIS is using much of the extra cash to pursue a growth strategy 
through acquisition of a global network to both compete with Al-Queda and other state-actors 
worldwide.   
Experimentation to Test the Hypothesis  
Having formed a logical construct of the hypothesis and its simulated baseline, it is worth 
returning to the proposed hypothesis: the Islamic State (ISIS) is an emerging-state actor which is using 
methods of irregular warfare to capture territory in order to influence populations (“coercive power”) 
which it then attempts to govern in furtherance of its objective to become a functioning state (“legitimate 
power”).  
This hypothesis can be tested against the simulation model. Six propositions emerge from the 
hypothesis. Each can be tested quantitatively by making changes to the model as described in Table 2.  
Table 2: Proposition Tests 
Proposition Tested Change Summary Subsystem & Formulation 
Proposition 1: ISIS must take and 
control territory. 
Remove ability to gain 
territory as a result of 
combat.  
Combat Simulator Changes: 
FLOT Movement Rate (FMR) = ((FMR Base1+FMR 
Base2)*"High Intensity FLOT Movement Rate (FMR) 
Multiplier")*Disable FLOT 
Disable FLOT = 1 (normal) OR 0 (Proposition 1)  
Proposition 2a: The territory must have 
valuable resources.  
2b: Black market price of oil is $22/bbl 
Sever link to oil 
production from 
captured territory or 
Territory Subsystem Changes: 
Available Oil Production = 5.013e+008*Disable Oil 
Disable Oil = 1 (normal) OR 0 (Proposition 2) 
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2c: Black market price of oil drops to 
$11/bbl. 
adjust price per bbl. 2b: Price per Barrel of Oil is reduced from $45/bbl to 
$22/bbl & 2c: Price per Barrel of Oil is reduced from 
$45/bbl to $11/bbl 
Proposition 3: The transition from 
coercively controlled to legitimately 
governed population cannot be too 
slow.  
 
Increase Normal Time 
to Transition by 200%, 
300% and 400%. 
Governance & Population Subsystem Changes: 
Normal Time to Transition to Governance = 1 
(6months) is changed to: 3a = 2 (12months), 3b = 3(18 
months) 3c = 4 (24 months) and 3d= 100 (disabled) 
Proposition 4: Local grievances are 
required for local recruiting. 
Disable local recruiting 
only. 
Militant Recruiting & Losses Subsystem Changes: 
(Recruit able Population of Controlled 
Population*Local Recruiting Rate*"Effect of 
Remaining Recruits on Local Recruiting (Opposition & 
Militant)")*Disable Local Recruiting 
Disable Local Recruiting = 1 (Normal) or 0 
(Proposition 4) 
Proposition 5: Foreign recruits are 
required. 
Disable foreign 
recruiting in the model.  
(Actual Recruits per Suicide Attack*"Suicide Actions 
(Military Actions/Period)")*Foreign Recruiting 
Eliminated)*Bankruptcy Switch 
Foreign Recruiting Eliminated = 1 (Normal) or 0 
(Proposition 5) 
Proposition 6: A “classical” insurgency 
is modeled with no transition to 
governance or significant foreign 
recruiting. 
Combine Propositions 
3d & 5. 
See above. 
 
The subsequent simulation results of these experiments can be compared to the baseline 
performance. Significant change in the behavior mode (general shape and magnitude of behavior over 
time) are noteworthy, while minimal change is of little value. Initial testing identified a model boundary 
validation issue. The negative feedback loop characteristics of Resistance & Uprising did not seem to be 
creating any difference in scenarios 3a–3d, exactly where they would most logically occur. However 
when the model duration was extended from 2017 to 2020, these behaviors began emerging and played 
a significant limiting role in further growth of ISIS. Continuing boundary tests of duration out to 2050 
identified additional behavior of interest emerged in 2030–2040 (ISIS was able to “regroup” and 
continue expanding). However, I considered this too far on the horizon to be of much practical use and 
instead re-ran all simulations with a new experimental duration boundary of 2020. The results of these 
tests are summarized in Table 3 and provide final values across four performance measures compared to 
the baseline.   
© Tim Clancy MAR 2015                               Contact: timothy.clancy.nv@gmail.com 34
Table 3: Proposition Test Results 
 
The evidence for Propositions 1 & 2a indicates that an emerging-state actor must take territory 
upon which some valuable resource exists. However, the performance of 2b & 2c indicate that the 
resource need not be all that valuable relative to the expenses of maintaining the emerging-state actor. 
ISIS still performs just as well when black market oil sells for $22bbl and $11bbl respectively vs. 
$45bbl. The reasons are two fold. The cost of ISIS operations is very low relative to the incoming 
revenue. This should come as no surprise, as insurgencies have been funding themselves on shoestring 
Ending 2020 
Values
Territory % 
Controlled
"Population Controlled by 
Coercive Power (People)"
"Population 
Governed through 
Legitimacy (People)"
"ISIS Finances 
(Dollars)"
"ISIS 
Militants 
(People)"
Baseline 46% 6,916,093                                 6,623,453                     5,738,208,768$       135,069       
Proposition 1: 
No Territory 0% 239,010                                    235,555                        (42,046,628)$           5,056           
Proposition 2a: 
No Oil 0% 504,660                                    882,578                        (11,257,459)$           9,291           
Proposition 2b: 
Oil is $22/bbl 46% 6,922,469                                 6,641,158                     2,745,061,888$       133,984       
Proposition 2c: 
Oil is $10/bbl 46% 6,876,500                                 6,567,161                     1,216,870,528$       144,871       
Proposition 3a: 
Gain in 
Legitimacy 2x 
Slower 46% 6,912,644                                 5,533,945                     5,557,155,328$       140,954       
Proposition 3b: 
Gain in 
Legitimacy 3x 
Slower 44% 6,508,733                                 4,587,748                     5,356,189,184$       126,160       
Proposition 3c: 
Gain in 
Legitimacy x4 
Slower 28% 5,943,307                                 3,915,551                     5,164,296,704$       54,517         
Proposition 3d: 
Gain in 
Legitimacy 
x100 Slower 22% 5,714,829                                 233,571                        4,906,823,168$       47,802         
Proposition 4: 
Disable Local 
Recruiting 5% 1,407,003                                 1,464,055                     1,112,226,560$       13,854         
Proposition 5: 
Disable Foreign 
Recruiting 44% 6,601,304                                 6,415,755                     5,530,777,088$       73,308         
Proposition 6: 
Combine 
Proposition #3 
& #5 23% 5,767,964                                 226,966                        4,890,185,216$       33,360         
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budgets for decades. However, the value of the resource relative to the expenses allows fast growth early 
on in the emerging-state actor life cycle. Once it has gained a sufficient Controlled Population and 
begun shifting it to Governed by Legitimacy, the resource revenues become less important to local 
operations. This allows the emerging-state actor to take the surplus funds provided by the valuable 
resource and begin expansion operations abroad. By 2020, even with lower oil revenues, ISIS still 
achieves significant performance according to the model. It holds only slightly less cash reserves, 
though still measured in billions. Though beyond the scope of this paper, the following questions arise: 
do emerging-state actors emerge in regions of low governance regions with valuable territorially 
controllable resources because the incentive is higher? Or do we only know of emerging-state actors in 
these areas because the lack of resources tends to cripple emerging-state actors from governing openly 
early on? Future research might consider whether classical insurgents desire to act more openly but 
adapt to clandestine activities out of necessity.  
Propositions 3a–3d confirms that the time it takes to transition from coercive power to legitimate 
power is important, but there some range within 6 (baseline), 12 (3a) and 18 (3b) month transitions still 
allows ISIS to grow rapidly. However, periods of 24 months (3c) and higher (3d) sharply reduce 
performance. Propositions 4 & 5 confirm that both local recruiting and foreign recruiting are essential. 
Although it may not be surprising that local recruiting is essential, the significant difference foreign 
recruiting makes in comparing Proposition 5 performance to the Baseline is noteworthy.  Finally, 
although the “classical insurgency” (6) generates a large area of coercive influence and significant cash–
–primarily because the territory ISIS controls produces oil––it only controls half of the territory of the 
emerging-state actor model, and less than a quarter of the militants under arms.   
This performance of Proposition 6, depicting a classical insurgency, is worth comparing in 
greater detail to the hypothesis that ISIS is an emerging-state actor. We can explore this by replicating 
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the dashboard of charts previously used, but also plotting both the Baseline and Proposition 6 in the 
same dashboard format used in Figure 15. Both simulations are initialized with the same parameter 
values, matching actual starting conditions of 2013. Both simulations are run absent of significant third 
party intervention in Iraq or Syria through 2020.  
In the Baseline and Proposition 6 simulations ISIS expands to roughly the same territorial extent, 
where both simulated ISIS entities stall, failing to advance further. Although in the Baseline simulation 
ISIS is able to maintain this territory and even grow its militant base, in the simulation of Proposition 6 
ISIS begins declining from 2017 onward and then collapsing between 2019–2020. This collapse is 
caused by external pressure of Syrian and Iraqi forces, as well as internal uprisings of local opposition 
fighters who attack ISIS’s existing holdings. The quantitative depiction of this stall and collapse is 
depicted in Figure 16, with a narrative provided afterwards. 
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Figure 15: Dashboard Performance Baseline (Emerging-State Actor) vs. Proposition 6 (Classical Insurgency) 
 
The graph narratives are of emerging-state actor ISIS holding onto its gained territory, as well as 
its controlled population, primarily because its militant base is higher than in the classical insurgency of 
Proposition 6, which loses nearly half of the gained territory. The Baseline behavior occurs because the 
emerging-state actor ISIS is attracting foreign fighters. Even though these foreign fighters cause friction, 
which results in a higher need for garrison troops in occupied territories, the steady flow of fighters 
ultimately provides enough troops to supply those garrison requirements. This reduces local opposition. 
The resistance peaks early and begins declining due to the shift from coercive to legitimate 
governmental power. The classical insurgency test of Proposition 6 shows that ISIS would gain territory 
and population quickly as a local-only force.  However, without being able to draw in foreign recruits or 
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transition to a governing system, ISIS would struggle to garrison an ever-increasing restive population. 
Eventually, the insurgency cannot garrison sufficiently and a mass uprising breaks out in late 2017, 
resulting in the loss of the territory. It is possible that AQI suffered a scenario such as this in 2006, 
rapidly gaining control of nearly one million civilians, but unable to garrison sufficiently or transition to 
a governing system because they remained clandestine. The rapid decline of ISIS in the Proposition 6 
model bears similarities to the AQI collapse in 2006, as the Anbar Awakening provided just the kind of 
massive backlash indicated by this model. However, it should be clear, this model does not simulate 
AQI or the conditions in 2006, and there were many other conditions which occurred simultaneously 
with the Anbar Awakening.  
Policy Tests to Contain ISIS 
Best Case Tests 
With some understanding of the theory of emerging-state actors, we can shift to policy analysis. What 
available and politically plausible policies will contain or defeat an emerging-state actor like ISIS? 
 
The model is set to enable policy testing against the Strategic Architecture. Currently debated policies 
on how to confront ISIS are stated below in the form of how they might affect resource dynamic flows 
into the key resource stocks. These only include politically viable policies, so a full-scale ground 
invasion by US forces is ruled out: 
1. Do nothing. 
2. Attack ISIS’s oil production (BPD) and work to reduce the effectiveness of oil smuggling ($ per 
BPD) in order to decrease the inflow of revenue to ISIS Finances. 
3. Convince allies not to pay ransoms for ISIS hostages to decrease the inflow of revenue to ISIS 
Finances. 
4. Embed military advisers and personnel to improve the fighting quality via a boost to morale and 
experience of forces opposing ISIS, and to increase the outflow of ISIS Militants (killed or 
capture), and decrease the rate at which Territory is Controlled by ISIS. 
5. Work to reduce the effectiveness of foreign recruiting to reduce the inflow to ISIS Militants.  
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6. Supply opposing forces with advanced military equipment improving their capabilities (Weapon 
Values) in order to increase the outflow of ISIS Militants (killed or capture) and decrease the rate 
at which Territory is Controlled by ISIS. 
7. Leverage close air support missions to aid opposing forces engaged in combat with ISIS, in order 
to increase the outflow of ISIS Militants (killed or capture) and decrease the rate at which 
Territory is Controlled by ISIS. 
 
One type of policy analysis available is a “hypothetical best case” scenario. These policies are 
tested without realistic operational constraints and begin at 2013. These best case results can then be 
compared to the baseline, which is the policy of “do nothing.” If even the “‘best case” scenario does not 
perform better than the baseline, it is unlikely to do so when realistic operational constraints and an 
implementation timetable is placed upon it. The hypothetical tests involve arbitrarily setting parameters 
in the model to the values indicated in Table 1. 
Table 4: Hypothetical Best Case Policy Tests Summary 
Proposition Tested Hypothetical Best Case  Subsystem & Formulation 
Policy 1: Do nothing. (Baseline)  No Changes No Changes 
Policy 2: Attack ISIS’s oil production 
(BPD) and work to reduce the 
effectiveness of oil smuggling ($ per 
BPD) in order to decrease the inflow of 
revenue to ISIS Finances. 
Sever link to oil 
production from 
captured territory. 
Territory Subsystem Changes: 
Available Oil Production = 5.013e+008*Disable Oil 
Disable Oil = 1 (normal) OR 0 (Proposition 2) 
 
Policy 3: Convince allies not to pay 
ransoms for ISIS hostages to decrease 
the inflow of revenue to ISIS Finances. 
Sever link to ransom 
revenue creation. 
Revenue Subsystem Changes: 
IF THEN ELSE (Time>Policy Intervention Time, 
Ransom Elimination,1) 
Ransom Elimination = 1 (normal) OR 0 (Policy3) 
Policy 4: Embed military advisers and 
personnel to improve the fighting 
quality via a boost to morale and 
experience of forces opposing ISIS, in 
order to increase the outflow of ISIS 
militants (killed or capture) and 
decrease the rate at which territory is 
controlled by ISIS. 
Increase Blue Force 
Morale by 25% and 
Blue Force Average 
Experience by 1 Year. 
Territory Subsystem Changes: 
Moral Effect = IF THEN ELSE(Time>Policy 
Intervention Time,"Embed US Advisers (Morale)",0) 
Embed Us Advisors (Morale) = 0 (Normal) OR .25 
(Policy4) 
Experience Effect = IF THEN ELSE(Time>Policy 
Intervention Time,"Embed US Adivsers 
(Experience)",0) 
Embed US Advisors (Experience) = 0 (Normal) or 1 
(Policy4) 
  
Policy 5: Work to reduce the 
effectiveness of foreign recruiting to 
reduce the inflow to ISIS Militants.  
Disable foreign 
recruiting in the model.  
(Actual Recruits per Suicide Attack*"Suicide Actions 
(Military Actions/Period)")*Foreign Recruiting 
Eliminated)*Bankruptcy Switch 
Foreign Recruiting Eliminated = 1 (Normal) or 0 
(Proposition 5) 
Policy 6: Supply opposing forces with 
advanced military equipment, 
improving their capabilities (Weapon 
Values) in order to increase the outflow 
Increase Weapons 
Value for Blue Forces 
by 25%. 
 
Situational Force Scoring Subsystem: 
SFS Avg Blue Inf WEI/WUV = 1+Supply Better US 
Equipment 
Supply Better US Equipment =  0 (Normal) .25 (Policy 
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of ISIS Militants (killed or capture) and 
decrease the rate at which territory is 
controlled by ISIS. 
6) 
The same change is applied to Avg Blue Heavy 
Weapons & Artillery. 
Policy 7a & 7b: Leverage close air 
support missions to aid opposing forces 
engaged in combat with ISIS, in order 
to increase the outflow of ISIS militants 
(killed or capture) and decrease the rate 
at which territory is controlled by ISIS. 
 
Increase overall Blue 
Force Combat Strength 
by 10% for 7a and 50% 
for 7b representing 
minimal and intensive 
support. 
Blue Force Strength = (SFS Blue Heavy Weapons 
Situational Strength+SFS Blue Indirect Attack 
Situational Strength+SFS Blue Infantry Situational 
Strength 
)+((SFS Blue Heavy Weapons Situational 
Strength+SFS Blue Indirect Attack Situational 
Strength+SFS Blue Infantry Situational Strength 
)*Ground Support Campaign Start) 
Ground Support Campaign Start = IF THEN 
ELSE(Targeting Switch=0,US Airpower Support Step 
Height,0) 
Airpower Support Step = 0 (normal) 1.1 (7a minimal 
campaign) and 1.5 (7b intensive campaign) 
 
These tests are also implemented with zero ramp up time and beginning at the start of the simulation in 
2103, unrealistic in the real world but simplified for purposes of evaluating if these polices could ever be 
successful. 
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The results of these tests are summarized in Table 1 that provides final values across four 
performance measures compared to the baseline.   
Table 5: Hypothetical Best Case Results 
 
 
 
 
Only two policies in the best case scenario create meaningful change. The first is Policy 2, the complete 
reduction of oil revenue from the beginning hamstrings ISIS’s performance.  The second, Policy 5, 
eliminates foreign recruits, leaving ISIS with just over half the militants as in the baseline, but at one of 
the largest controlled populations. This seemingly paradoxical result is explained in more detail below.  
Even though the remaining policies all seem to end at about the same place, the behavior patterns over 
time show that some of these policies have delayed the pace at which ISIS expanded as shown below in 
Figure 6 comparing policies 3 and 4 and 6 and 7b with the baseline in terms of % of territory controlled 
by 2020. However this is simply delaying the inevitable, as in all scenarios ISIS has reached its natural 
limit of territorial gain at about 47% of Syria and Iraq by 2016.  
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Figure 16: Pct of Territory Controlled in Select Policy Scenarios 
 
A few insights are gained even from this unrealistic best case scenario tests. Some policies actually 
improve ISIS’s position while others only delay the inevitable, and only one policy significantly changes 
the outcome (Policy 2). Insights from these results are discussed below as a Foreign Recruiting Dilemma 
and Partial Measures Paradox.  
The Foreign Recruiting Dilemma  
The results for Foreign Recruiting (Policy 5) are surprising, as it leaves ISIS in a stronger position, even 
with fewer militants. This can be explained by looking at Average Militant Experience, which is a 
tracking co-flow of ISIS militants and places it next to percent of Local vs. Foreign Troops that tracks 
the mix of locally recruited ISIS fighters versus Foreign Recruits from abroad.  
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Figure 17: Foreign Recruiting Dilemma 
  
The more foreign recruits ISIS has, the lower its Average Militant Experience will be as the foreign 
recruits arrive. Since the Average Militant Experience drives combat performance, recruiting 
performance, resource exploitation, transition to governance, and more, the more skilled ISIS is in terms 
of the Average Militant Experience, the better it performs. When Policy 5 eliminates foreign recruits by 
100% the loss in manpower is more than made up for by the improvement in other factors that drive 
ISIS’s performance. This is not to say there are not very valid reasons for seeking to stem the flow of 
foreign recruits, such as they may return from whence they came, now militarized. Such factors and 
considerations are beyond the scope of this model. 
 
The Partial Measures Paradox 
Policy 4 (embed advisors) and Policy 6 (supply weaponry) result in ISIS controlling less 
population, but having more militants by the end of the scenario. This is explainable by the Partial 
Measures Paradox, an important dynamic that can emerge in many policy tests. In essence, the Partial 
Measures Paradox shows that by slowing ISIS down early, it keeps them from growing too fast and 
contains them to territory that is more favorable to their causes both in terms of socio-ethnic 
demographics and resource extraction. This actually allows them to gain more recruits and resources 
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earlier than they would have by growing rapidly and overextending themselves into less favorable areas, 
which require more garrisons and provides less recruits. The temporary setback to territory gain is 
reversed when ISIS has increased its manpower and finances, and now stronger than it would’ve been 
originally, it performs better over time in the ensuing territories. This can be demonstrated in a few 
charts narrowed in on a timeline 2014–2016, the key period where this paradox emerges.   
 
 
Figure 18: Partial Measures Paradox 2014-2016 
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 First, as expected we see that Policy 4 and Policy 6 both limited ISIS’s Forward Movement Rate 
due to the marginally increased combat effectiveness provided by U.S. support via embedded advisors 
and advanced weaponry. This is reflected in the decreased amount of territory controlled by ISIS.  
However, the local recruiting and foreign recruiting are both higher, as the areas ISIS controls are more 
favorable. Likewise the desired garrison and police forces are lower, which in turn allows for more 
military actions. In the long run, the larger militant force will gain experience earlier than would have 
occurred in the baseline scenario, allowing ISIS to outperform what would have occurred had they been 
allowed to expand beyond their favorable areas early on.  Finally, when the U.S. supplies the Blue Force 
(the opponents of ISIS) with more powerful weapons, as ISIS gains a portion of that equipment through 
scavenging on the battlefield, they gain that improved combat effectiveness.  
Portfolio Analysis with Operational Constraints  
Another form of policy test that can be conducted on the model is to simulate a basket of policy 
options, selecting a timing window and with operational constraints that are realistic. We know that 
Policy 2, attacking the ISIS oil infrastructure stopped ISIS’s growth in its track in the hypothetical best 
case scenario, but this policy assumed a one hundred percent successful destruction of ISIS’s nascent oil 
infrastructure in 2013, well before ISIS was considered a serious national security threat. However, at 
the point the U.S. began its air campaign against ISIS during the Anbar offensive of 2014, would 
combining additional policies with targeting oil production via an air campaign have resulted in 
reversing or containing ISIS’s growth? Or will it result in a version of the partial measures paradox? 
 In this portfolio analysis, Policies 2, 4, 6, and 7 are combined. This scenario is equivalent to a 
U.S. and Coalition air campaign that targets both ISIS oil infrastructures as well as provides close-air 
support to Blue Forces. In addition, U.S. advisors are embedded with Blue Forces and advanced U.S. 
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weaponry is supplied to Blue Forces. This is not an implausible scenario to simulate, as it accounts for a 
significant intervention, but well short of a full-scale invasion that would be politically untenable. The 
intervention date is set at June of 2014, the actual point in which U.S. military intervention began with 
an air campaign against ISIS. Since Policies 4 and 6 are not in conflict, they can be tested as they were 
individually above. However, policies 2 and 7 both rely on air assets to conduct different missions, 
where one is the targeting of ISIS oil infrastructure, and the other a close-combat support of Blue 
Forces. These options are further constrained by significant U.S. airpower can be projected into the 
region. The current rate of air strikes is roughly 10 per day roughly split between Iraq and Syria (see 
Appendix B on Airpower). Furthermore, an air strike targeting a modular oil refinery takes about 
between 300–500 BPD of production. How many air strikes are needed to significantly impact ISIS’s oil 
production? And would that level of airpower detract from the ability to provide close ground support? 
To test these parameters three activity levels will be set for airpower: 10 per day to indicate 
today’s policy, 100 per day to indicate a ten-fold increase in operational tempo, and 500 per day to 
indicate a theoretical maximum sustained operational tempo for a significant period of time. 27  
Furthermore the air strikes will target ISIS oil production 100% until it is destroyed, and then shift into a 
ground support role. This is based off the knowledge that eliminating ISIS’s oil revenue was a key factor 
in reducing its growth under the hypothetical best case scenario. Parameters are indicated in Table 3. All 
policies include embedding U.S. troops as advisors and supplying weaponry as per Policies 4 and 6 
previously, and all policies begin with an intervention date in the model of June 2014 (2014.5). 
Table 5: Portfolio Policy Analysis Air Campaign Parameters 
Scenario Strikes/Day Strikes vs. Oil 
Production until 
Destroyed 
Combat 
Effectiveness 
increase from 
Ground Support 
Airpower after Oil 
                                                 
27 This tempo was established and maintained for 10 weeks in the late 1990’s Kosovo Air Campaign. The largest single-day 
airpower attack in modern history was the first day of the invasion of Iraq where 1200 strikes were carried out in a single day. 
This is not considered sustainable long term.  
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Destroyed 
Policy 8 Minimal 
Air Campaign 
10/day 10/day 1% 
Policy 9 Significant 
Air Campaign 
100/day 100/day 10% 
Policy 10 Intensive 
Air Campaign 
500/day 500/day 50% 
 
We can now compare these portfolio policies against the baseline performance against the original 
dashboard used above.  
 
Figure 19: Portfolio Analysis with Operational Constraints Implemented at 2014.5 
 
 In narrative, both Policies 8 and 9 struggle to materially impact the conflict. This is because the 
rates of strikes per day against the oil production are insufficient to destroy it completely over the length 
of the simulation. Only Policy 10, at a 500 strikes per day tempo can both destroy the oil production and 
then subsequently shift to support the ground war with air strikes. As a result, only Policy 10 shows ISIS 
being pushed back, its population under control reduced, number of militants depleted. Even with a 
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smaller population to control, Policy 10 still shows a significant amount of local opposition fighters that 
ISIS must now combat. In summary, the results are better, but not ideal. How is it that a combination of 
effective policies performed little better than any one single policy? The reason is threefold: the partial 
measures paradox, timing, and overlapping targets. As the partial measures paradox has been discussed 
above, focus now turns to matters of timing and overlap of targets.  
 
Policy Timing  
With an emerging-state actor like ISIS there are windows of opportunity that have the maximum effect. 
These windows exist prior to the significant acquisition of territory that grants them access to 
exploitable resources and population to control and then seek to govern. To illustrate the importance of 
timing, the set of same policy interventions as Policy 8 can be moved back to 2013.5, relabeled “Policy 
8 Early” and compared against Policy 10 begun in 2014.5. Policy 9 Early, Policy 10, and the baseline 
are now compared in the dashboard set of graphs.  
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Figure 20: Comparison of Significant Air Campaign at 2013.5 vs. Intensive Air Campaign at 2014.5 
 
As can be seen in Figure 10, even though the Significant Air Campaign of Policy 9 conducts 
only a fifth of the sorties as the Intensive Campaign, because it begins earlier in 2013.5 vs. 2014.5; 
Policy 9 has a greater  impact on the dynamics of the overall conflict. ISIS’s oil production, which is 
smaller, is destroyed more quickly, allowing air assets to switch to ground combat support. Even though 
these are only one-fifth of the strikes of the more detailed policy, because they are occurring earlier this 
ground combat support is preventing ISIS from gaining more territory. As ISIS cannot gain territory, it 
cannot gain more oil resources, populations to recruit from, militants, or other benefits. This is reflected 
in the sharply weaker performance of ISIS in Policy 9 across many of the charts. However, the analysis 
would also reflect that because ISIS was never able to conduct a foreign recruiting campaign by 
launching suicide bombing and IED attacks, the number of foreign recruits remains low relative to the 
population. This means that what populations ISIS does control are easier to garrison and police than in 
other scenarios where more of their force is composed of foreign fighters. Timing therefore is crucial for 
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policy consideration, and the earlier the better with an opponent who seeks to gain power through 
territorial conquest as an emerging-state actor like ISIS would.  
POLICY OVERLAP 
A second challenge to the set of policies is overlap of targeting factors. All three policies aim at 
combating the power of the opposition: embedding U.S. troops to bolster experience and morale, 
equipping opposition forces with modern U.S. weaponry, and providing close combat support. In 
combat, more ISIS forces are destroyed relative to how many would have been, and this reduces ISIS 
militants through the outflow of losses. Unfortunately unless the support is sufficient to actually enable 
the opposing forces to prevail over ISIS, the effect is not enough. The same ISIS militant can only be 
killed or detained once, whether by a more experienced and higher morale soldier, through better 
equipment, or U.S. combat airpower.  
Incremental Knowledge Gain  
Conducting a limited suite of policy intervention evaluations does reveal key insights into conducting 
interventions against emerging-state actors. Exogenous factors can provide only an incremental setback 
for the emerging-state actor until territory is taken away from them, and they are challenged to 
overcome the reinforcing feedback loops from which an emerging-state actor benefits. Because an 
emerging state actor relies on few exogenous factors for its success, there are only limited avenues to 
“harm” an actor like ISIS from outside its operative territory. Except for a minimal amount of foreign 
donations and the flow of foreign recruits, all other key resources ISIS relies upon to be successful can 
be found within the territory they control. It follows that only the retaking of this territory, in some 
manner that disrupts the ability of an emerging state actor to govern, will lead to conditions that may 
enable changing the dynamic of behavior. But taking territory severs the key feedback loops that make 
emerging state actors different––and more dangerous––than a classic insurgent non-state actor. This is a 
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key difference to understand from a policy standpoint between classic non-state actor insurgents and 
emerging state actors such as ISIS.  
Conclusion 
The hypothesis that the Islamic State is an emerging-state actor using the means of irregular 
warfare to usurp existing state-actors to gain control of target populations is considered plausible, 
though not proven, by the limited initial simulation tests conducted in this paper. The policy analysis 
shows the differences in performance of an emerging-state model and a classical insurgency model. 
Calling upon global rather than local grievances the emerging-state actor draws foreign fighters and 
seizes territory upon which it exercises sovereign control and begins openly governing. The use of 
governing mechanisms shifts the population from being controlled by coercive power to being governed 
by legitimacy, freeing up garrison troops to continue expansion and territorial gain. The dynamic 
hypothesis of an emerging-state actor is better able to explain ISIS’s behavior pattern than traditional 
insurgency models. These propositions not only define the Islamic State but also form the basis of a 
theory of emerging-state actor conflicts.  
Intervention policies against emerging-state actors can be simulated in isolation, in combination, 
and at different timing windows. Evaluation of these policies yields key insights into the dynamics of 
intervention against these actors and the dilemmas policy planners face and militaries may encounter 
when executing interventions. Reducing or degrading ISIS’s capabilities from abroad is made 
exceedingly difficult because the majority of their resources are generated from within the territory they 
control. There are few levers to pull from outside this territory, as any efforts that end up being diluted 
into partial measures risk leaving ISIS in a better position than when it started. Additionally, how 
interventions are timed is critical in that those timed after the acquisition of territory have significantly 
less effect than prior to territorial gain. Finally, that many policies overlap over the same form of target. 
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Attempting to kill an ISIS militant means that even a portfolio of policies may not have an aggregate 
effect equal to the sum of its parts.  
This paper creates a detailed scenario-based simulation model allowing for future policy testing 
of what interventions might help contain or mitigate the growth of ISIS and other emerging-state actors. 
It can also provides a basis for more experiments and examination of behavior of emerging-state actors 
as well as insurgency non-state actors over time.  
Limitations related to modeling choices are covered at the conclusion of the Appendix B.  
Theoretical limitations exist in that there may be other equally plausible explanations for ISIS’s 
performance that are localized to Syria and Iraq, such as the existing sectarian and ethno-social tensions 
ISIS is able to capitalize upon. If these conditions are enabling ISIS’s growth, the theory presented here 
may not be transferable to other regions that do not reflect such a fractured environment. Additional 
limitations lie in the model boundaries selected as discussed in the slicing section of the paper. As 
indicated, even in the initial tests, adjusting the duration boundary from 2017 to 2020 revealed 
interesting behavior. Since all models are reflective of these modeling choices, simulations made outside 
the boundaries may point to different causes. Finally, there is no mental model of the behavior or 
ideation of the participants, be they ISIS militants, foreign recruits, Blue Force conscripts, or opposition 
local fighters, and this may overlook significant factors of agent motivation.  
For policy analysis, limitations include that the policies selected for analysis were not 
comprehensive of all possible policies and combinations, but instead selected to illustrate key dynamics 
and insight. In some cases, parameter values were arbitrarily chosen to represent the policies. 
Combinations of different policies, or tested with different parameters, could yield contrary results. 
Finally, there is no mental model of the behavior or ideation of the participants in the simulation model.  
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Introduction of foreign-national troops, even as advisors, could engender significant local distrust and 
may result in a dramatic change from the performance of a policy discussed above.  
Future work with this theory could involve resolving the above weaknesses and improving 
policy analysis fidelity by including more accurate parameterization, like a “flight simulator” user 
controller to enable construction of different policy options as well as optimization testing to cover a 
broader policy space with thousands of permutations rather than a handful. The SFS Combat Simulator 
sector and Territory sector represent a novel approach to resolving both high fidelity combat simulation 
and geospatial detail in system dynamics model. This is worth additional exploration and explanation as 
noteworthy contribution to simulation modeling methodology for conflict models.  
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Appendix A – Model Structure Overview & Equations  
Each model sector is represented first via a visual overview of the structure followed by the complete 
list of equations. Overall simulation control parameters are:  
   
 
(001) FINAL TIME  = 2020 
 Units: Period 
 The final time for the simulation. 
 
(002) INITIAL TIME  = 2013 
 Units: Period 
 The initial time for the simulation. 
 
(003) SAVEPER  =  
         TIME STEP 
 Units: Period [0,?] 
 The frequency with which output is stored. 
 
(004) TIME STEP  = 0.0055 
 Units: Period [0,?] 
 The time step for the simulation. 
 
******************************** 
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Resource Strategy Map Sector Structure  
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Resource Strategy Map Sector Equations 
(005) "% Controlled of Overall Population"= 
  ZIDZ("Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)", "Population (People)") 
 Units: Fraction 
  
(012) "% of Controlled Population that is Governed"= 
  ZIDZ("Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)","Population Controlled by 
Coercive Power (People)") 
 Units: Fraction 
  
(017) "% of Territory Controlled by ISIS"= 
  "Territory ISIS Controlled (km^2)"/"Territory (km^2)" 
 Units: Percentage 
  
(024) "Additions (People per Period)"= 
  "Incoming Militants (People)" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(025) "Additions (Pieces per Period)"= 
  Heavy Weapons Looted 
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(037) Average Militant Experience= 
  ZIDZ("Militant Experience (Years)","ISIS Militants (People)") 
 Units: Exp Years/Person 
  
(039) "Baseline Switch (1 = On) 1"= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(040) "Baseline Switch (1 = On)"= 
  0 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(044) "Births & Immigration (People/Period)"= 
  0 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(068) Capability of Military Actions based on Squads= 
  ISIS Squads*Normal Military Capability of Squads 
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(070) Change in Controlled Population= 
  ISIS Controlled Population-"Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" 
 Units: People 
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(071) "Change in Squads (Squads/Period)"= 
  (Desired Squads-ISIS Squads)/Time to Form Squads 
 Units: Squads/Period 
  
(094) "Deaths, Recruiting & Emmigration (People/Period)"= 
  "Population Outflow (People/Period)" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(103) Desired Shura Councils= 
  ("Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)"+Ungoverned Population)/Normal 
Ratio of Shura Councils to Population 
 Units: Councils 
  
(104) Desired Squads= 
  ("ISIS Militants (People)"-Actual Garrison)/Normal Size of Squad 
 Units: Squads 
  
(108) Disable FLOT= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Used to test Proposition 1. Normal value =1 , disabled value = 0. 
 
(110) Disable Local Recruiting= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Normal value is 1, set to 0 to test Proposition 4. 
 
(111) Disable Oil= 
  1 
 Units: Barrels/Period 
 Used for Proposition 2 - normal value =1, disabled value = 0 
 
(124) Effective Time to Transition to Governance= 
  Normal Time to Transition to Governance*Effect of Shura Council Sufficiency on 
Transition to Governance 
 Units: Period 
  
(125) "Embed US Adivsers (Experience)"= 
  1 
 Units: Exp Years 
 0 is normal. 1 is the increase in average Exp Years due to having US troops embedded. 
 
(126) "Embed US Advisers (Morale)"= 
  0.25 
 Units: Dmnl 
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 0 is normal. .25 is nominal additional morale factor for US troops being embedded. 
 
(132) "Expenses before Attacks (Dollars per Period)"= 
  "Administration & Governance Expense (Dollars per Period)"+"Death Benefits (Dollars 
per Period)"+"Detention Benefits (Dollars per Period)" 
  +"Media Border Security & Other Expenses (Dollars per Period)"+"Military Procurement 
(Dollars per Period)" 
  +"Payroll (Dollars per Period)" 
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(137) Experience gain from Joining Militants= 
  (Average Experience of Escaped Detainee*"Escaped Detainees Joining ISIS 
(People)")+("Foreign Recruiting (People)"*Average Experience of Foreign Recruit 
 )+("Local Recruiting (People)"*Average Experience of Local Recruit) 
 Units: Exp Years/Period 
  
(139) "FLOT Movement Rate (FMR)"= 
  (((FMR Base1+FMR Base2)*"High Intensity FLOT Movement Rate (FMR) 
Multiplier")*Disable FLOT)*Movement Direction 
 Units: "km^2" 
  
(143) Foreign Recruiting Eliminated= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Normal is 1. 0 means foreign recruiting is completely eliminated. 
 
(144) "Gain in Control (People/Period)"= 
  Change in Controlled Population/Time to Establish Control 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(145) Gain in Experience= 
  Experience gain from Joining Militants+Militant Experience Gain 
 Units: Exp Years/Period 
  
(149) "Heavy Weapon Losses (Pieces per Period)"= 
  MAX(0,"Losses (Pieces per Period)") 
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(150) "Heavy Weapons (Pieces)"= INTEG ( 
  "Heavy Weapon Additions (Pieces per Period)"-"Heavy Weapon Losses (Pieces per 
Period)", 
   0) 
 Units: Pieces 
  
(156) "Incoming Militants (People)"= 
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  "Local Recruiting (People)"+"Foreign Recruiting (People)"+"Escaped Detainees Joining 
ISIS (People)" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(157) "Incoming Revenue (Dollars per Period)"= 
  "Revenue (Dollars per Period)" 
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(170) Initial Population= 
  3.99671e+007 
 Units: People 
  
(176) "ISIS Finances (Dollars)"= INTEG ( 
  "Incoming Revenue (Dollars per Period)"-"Outgoing Expenses (Dollars per Period)", 
   "ZScenario1: Starting Cash") 
 Units: Dollars 
 ("Baseline Switch (1 = On)"*(Capability of Military Actions based on Squads*Cost per 
Attack))+("Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"*"ZScenario1:  
   Starting Cash") 
 
(178) "ISIS Militants (People)"= INTEG ( 
  "Additions (People per Period)"-"Lossess (People per Period)", 
   ("Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"*ZScenario1 Starting Militants)) 
 Units: People 
 Scenario Determines starting value. 
 
(182) ISIS Squads= INTEG ( 
  "Change in Squads (Squads/Period)", 
   "ISIS Militants (People)"/Normal Size of Squad) 
 Units: Squads 
 Initialized at the starting Initial Number of Militants divided by the Normal Size of Squads 
 
(192) "Black Market Price per Barrel (Price per Barrel)"= 
  45 
 Units: Dollars/Barrels 
  
(196) "Heavy Weapon Additions (Pieces per Period)"= 
  "Additions (Pieces per Period)" 
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(200) "Loss of Control (People/Period)"= 
  Population Controlled Lost due to Population Leaving 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(201) Loss of Experience= 
  "Total Experience Loss due to Militant Losses (Exp Years)" 
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 Units: Exp Years/Period 
  
(202) "Losses (Pieces per Period)"= 
  "Lost in Battle (Pieces per Period)"+"Lost to Maintenance (Pieces per Period)" 
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(203) "Lossess (People per Period)"= 
  MAX(0,"Outgoing Militants (People)") 
 Units: People/Period 
 Fix max function with different first order control. MAX(0,("ISIS Militants (People)"-"Outgoing 
Militants (People)")/Time to Lose Militants) 
 
(209) "Militant Experience (Years)"= INTEG ( 
  Gain in Experience-Loss of Experience, 
   ("Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"*"ZScenario1: Starting Experience")) 
 Units: Exp Years 
  
(215) Militant Experience Gain= 
  "ISIS Militants (People)"*Experience gained per Period 
 Units: Exp Years/Period 
  
(227) Normal Ratio of Shura Councils to Population= 
  100000 
 Units: People/Council 
  
 
(229) Normal Size of Squad= 
  11 
 Units: People/Squad 
  
(230) Normal Time to Transition to Governance= 
  1 
 Units: Period 
 The Normal Time to transition from Controlled to Governance is 1 period, or 6 months. This is 
estimated based on the time it took ISIS to  
   establish governance in Ar Raqqah city from March 2013 to June 2013. The 
Normal time to Transition to Governance is modified by other  
   factors to determine the Effective time to Transition. 
 
(235) OpTempo Expenses= 
  Actual Military Actions*Cost per Military Action 
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(237) "Outgoing Expenses (Dollars per Period)"= 
  MAX(0,("Expenses before Attacks (Dollars per Period)"+OpTempo Expenses)) 
 Units: Dollars/Period 
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 MAX(0,"ISIS Finances (Dollars)"-("Expenses before Attacks (Dollars per Period)"+OpTempo 
Expenses)) 
 
(238) "Outgoing Militants (People)"= 
  "Deaths (People/Period)"+"Defections (People)"+"Detentions (People)" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(242) Period of Initial Finance= 
  1 
 Units: Period 
  
(244) Policy Intervention Time= 
  2013.5 
 Units: Period 
  
(245) "Population (People)"= INTEG ( 
  "Births & Immigration (People/Period)"-"Deaths, Recruiting & Emmigration 
(People/Period)", 
   Initial Population) 
 Units: People 
 Combined population of all Syrian and Iraqi Provinces. “Provinces of Syria”, Administrative 
Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last  
   modified September 22, 2004, accessed September 19th, 2014, 
http://www.statoids.com/usy.html. “Provinces of Iraq”, Administrative  
   Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last modified March 16, 2014, accessed 
September 19th, 2014, http://www.statoids.com/uiq.html. 
 
(246) "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)"= INTEG ( 
  "Gain in Control (People/Period)"-"Loss of Control (People/Period)", 
   ("Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"*"ZScenario1: Starting Population Controlled")) 
 Units: People 
  
(247) Population Controlled Lost due to Population Leaving= 
  "Deaths, Recruiting & Emmigration (People/Period)"*"% Controlled of Overall 
Population" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(248) Population Controlled Only= 
  "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)"-"Population Governed through 
Legitimacy (People)" 
 Units: People 
  
(249) "Population Governed Lost due to Loss of Control (People/Period)"= 
  "Loss of Control (People/Period)"*"% of Controlled Population that is Governed" 
 Units: People/Period 
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(250) "Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)"= INTEG ( 
  "Rate of Transition to Governance (People/Period)"-"Rate of Loss of Governance 
(People/Period)", 
   0) 
 Units: People 
  
(251) "Population Outflow (People/Period)"= 
  "Civilian Deaths (People/Period)"+"Local Recruiting (People)"+"Refugees Leaving 
(People/Period)" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(252) Portion of Period spent Fighting Battle= 
  0.0055 
 Units: Period 
  
(254) "Proposition Switch (1 = On) 0"= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(256) Ransom Elimination= 
  0 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Normal value is 1. 0 means all ransom is eliminated. 
 
(261) "Rate of Councils Formed (Councils/Period)"= 
  (Desired Shura Councils-"Shura Councils (Councils)")/Time to Stand up a Shura Council 
 Units: Councils/Period 
  
(268) "Rate of Loss of Governance (People/Period)"= 
  "Population Governed Lost due to Loss of Control (People/Period)" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(270) "Rate of Territory Gained (km^2/period)"= 
  "FLOT Movement Rate (FMR)"/Portion of Period spent Fighting Battle 
 Units: "km^2"/Period 
  
(271) "Rate of Territory Lost (km^2/Period)"= 
  0 
 Units: "km^2"/Period 
  
(272) "Rate of Transition to Governance (People/Period)"= 
  ("Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)"-"Population Governed through 
Legitimacy (People)")/Effective Time to Transition to Governance 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(292) "Remaining % of Population"= 
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  "Population (People)"/Initial Population 
 Units: Percentage 
  
(294) "Revenue (Dollars per Period)"= 
  "Donations (Dollars per Period)"+"Pre Donations Revenue (Dollars per Period)" 
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(296) "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(329) "Shura Councils (Councils)"= INTEG ( 
  "Rate of Councils Formed (Councils/Period)", 
   "Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)"/Normal Ratio of Shura 
Councils to Population) 
 Units: Councils 
 Initialized at the Starting Governed Population / Normal ratio of Shura Councils 
 
(336) Strikes per Day against Oil= 
  0 
 Units: Strikes/Period 
 Normal value is 0. Minimal is 5, Significant is 50, intensive is 250. 
 
(371) "Territory (km^2)"= 
  619308 
 Units: "km^2" 
 Includes all Provinces and Governates of Iraq and Syria. “Provinces of Syria”, Administrative 
Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last  
   modified September 22, 2004, accessed September 19th, 2014, 
http://www.statoids.com/usy.html. “Provinces of Iraq”, Administrative  
   Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last modified March 16, 2014, accessed 
September 19th, 2014, http://www.statoids.com/uiq.html. 
 
(372) "Territory ISIS Controlled (km^2)"= INTEG ( 
  "Rate of Territory Gained (km^2/period)"-"Rate of Territory Lost (km^2/Period)", 
   ("Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"*"ZScenario1: Starting Territory")) 
 Units: "km^2" 
  
(378) Time to Establish Control= 
  1 
 Units: Period 
  
(379) Time to Form Squads= 
  0.16 
 Units: Period 
 Ceylan Yeginsu, “ISIS Draws a Steady Stream of Recruits from Turkey,” nytimes.com,  
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   http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/world/europe/turkey-is-a-steady-source-of-
isis-recruits.html, accessed October 25, 2014. (CHECK LONGER  
   TRAINING PERIOD) 
 
(380) Time to Lose Militants= 
  1 
 Units: Period 
  
(384) Time to Stand up a Shura Council= 
  0.5 
 Units: Period 
 Estimated need source. 
 
(387) "Total Experience Loss due to Militant Losses (Exp Years)"= 
  (Average Militant Experience*"Outgoing Militants (People)") 
 Units: Exp Years/Period 
  
(394) US Airpower Support Step Height= 
  0 
 Units: Dmnl 
 1 is normal. 1.01 is minimal, 1.10 is significant and 1.5 is intensive. 
 
(395) USEquipmentModifier= 
  0.25 
 Units: Dmnl/Assets 
  
(399) ZScenario1 Starting Militants= 
  13200 
 Units: People 
  
(400) "ZScenario1: Starting Cash"= 
  Period of Initial Finance*(5e+006+("Expenses before Attacks (Dollars per Period)"*4)) 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(401) "ZScenario1: Starting Experience"= 
  39928 
 Units: Exp Years 
 2824 Escaped Detainees @ 10 years experience (28,240), 2600 Local Fighters @ 3 Years 
Epxerience (7800), 7776 Foreign Fighters at .5  
   Experience (3888) = 39928 
 
(402) "ZScenario1: Starting Population Controlled"= 
  0 
 Units: People 
  
(403) "ZScenario1: Starting Territory"= 
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  0 
 Units: "km^2" 
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(005) "% Controlled of Overall Population"= 
  ZIDZ("Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)", "Population (People)") 
 Units: Fraction 
  
(012) "% of Controlled Population that is Governed"= 
  ZIDZ("Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)","Population Controlled by 
Coercive Power (People)") 
 Units: Fraction 
  
(017) "% of Territory Controlled by ISIS"= 
  "Territory ISIS Controlled (km^2)"/"Territory (km^2)" 
 Units: Percentage 
  
(024) "Additions (People per Period)"= 
  "Incoming Militants (People)" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(025) "Additions (Pieces per Period)"= 
  Heavy Weapons Looted 
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(037) Average Militant Experience= 
  ZIDZ("Militant Experience (Years)","ISIS Militants (People)") 
 Units: Exp Years/Person 
  
(039) "Baseline Switch (1 = On) 1"= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(040) "Baseline Switch (1 = On)"= 
  0 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(044) "Births & Immigration (People/Period)"= 
  0 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(068) Capability of Military Actions based on Squads= 
  ISIS Squads*Normal Military Capability of Squads 
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(070) Change in Controlled Population= 
  ISIS Controlled Population-"Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" 
 Units: People 
  
(071) "Change in Squads (Squads/Period)"= 
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  (Desired Squads-ISIS Squads)/Time to Form Squads 
 Units: Squads/Period 
  
(094) "Deaths, Recruiting & Emmigration (People/Period)"= 
  "Population Outflow (People/Period)" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(103) Desired Shura Councils= 
  ("Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)"+Ungoverned Population)/Normal 
Ratio of Shura Councils to Population 
 Units: Councils 
  
(104) Desired Squads= 
  ("ISIS Militants (People)"-Actual Garrison)/Normal Size of Squad 
 Units: Squads 
  
(108) Disable FLOT= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Used to test Proposition 1. Normal value =1 , disabled value = 0. 
 
(110) Disable Local Recruiting= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Normal value is 1, set to 0 to test Proposition 4. 
 
(111) Disable Oil= 
  1 
 Units: Barrels/Period 
 Used for Proposition 2 - normal value =1, disabled value = 0 
 
(124) Effective Time to Transition to Governance= 
  Normal Time to Transition to Governance*Effect of Shura Council Sufficiency on 
Transition to Governance 
 Units: Period 
  
(125) "Embed US Adivsers (Experience)"= 
  1 
 Units: Exp Years 
 0 is normal. 1 is the increase in average Exp Years due to having US troops embedded. 
 
(126) "Embed US Advisers (Morale)"= 
  0.25 
 Units: Dmnl 
 0 is normal. .25 is nominal additional morale factor for US troops being embedded. 
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(132) "Expenses before Attacks (Dollars per Period)"= 
  "Administration & Governance Expense (Dollars per Period)"+"Death Benefits (Dollars 
per Period)"+"Detention Benefits (Dollars per Period)" 
  +"Media Border Security & Other Expenses (Dollars per Period)"+"Military Procurement 
(Dollars per Period)" 
  +"Payroll (Dollars per Period)" 
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(137) Experience gain from Joining Militants= 
  (Average Experience of Escaped Detainee*"Escaped Detainees Joining ISIS 
(People)")+("Foreign Recruiting (People)"*Average Experience of Foreign Recruit 
 )+("Local Recruiting (People)"*Average Experience of Local Recruit) 
 Units: Exp Years/Period 
  
(139) "FLOT Movement Rate (FMR)"= 
  (((FMR Base1+FMR Base2)*"High Intensity FLOT Movement Rate (FMR) 
Multiplier")*Disable FLOT)*Movement Direction 
 Units: "km^2" 
  
(143) Foreign Recruiting Eliminated= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Normal is 1. 0 means foreign recruiting is completely eliminated. 
 
(144) "Gain in Control (People/Period)"= 
  Change in Controlled Population/Time to Establish Control 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(145) Gain in Experience= 
  Experience gain from Joining Militants+Militant Experience Gain 
 Units: Exp Years/Period 
  
(149) "Heavy Weapon Losses (Pieces per Period)"= 
  MAX(0,"Losses (Pieces per Period)") 
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(150) "Heavy Weapons (Pieces)"= INTEG ( 
  "Heavy Weapon Additions (Pieces per Period)"-"Heavy Weapon Losses (Pieces per 
Period)", 
   0) 
 Units: Pieces 
  
(156) "Incoming Militants (People)"= 
  "Local Recruiting (People)"+"Foreign Recruiting (People)"+"Escaped Detainees Joining 
ISIS (People)" 
 Units: People/Period 
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(157) "Incoming Revenue (Dollars per Period)"= 
  "Revenue (Dollars per Period)" 
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(170) Initial Population= 
  3.99671e+007 
 Units: People 
  
(176) "ISIS Finances (Dollars)"= INTEG ( 
  "Incoming Revenue (Dollars per Period)"-"Outgoing Expenses (Dollars per Period)", 
   "ZScenario1: Starting Cash") 
 Units: Dollars 
 ("Baseline Switch (1 = On)"*(Capability of Military Actions based on Squads*Cost per 
Attack))+("Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"*"ZScenario1:  
   Starting Cash") 
 
(178) "ISIS Militants (People)"= INTEG ( 
  "Additions (People per Period)"-"Lossess (People per Period)", 
   ("Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"*ZScenario1 Starting Militants)) 
 Units: People 
 Scenario Determines starting value. 
 
(182) ISIS Squads= INTEG ( 
  "Change in Squads (Squads/Period)", 
   "ISIS Militants (People)"/Normal Size of Squad) 
 Units: Squads 
 Initialized at the starting Initial Number of Militants divided by the Normal Size of Squads 
 
(192) "Black Market Price per Barrel (Price per Barrel)"= 
  45 
 Units: Dollars/Barrels 
  
(196) "Heavy Weapon Additions (Pieces per Period)"= 
  "Additions (Pieces per Period)" 
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(200) "Loss of Control (People/Period)"= 
  Population Controlled Lost due to Population Leaving 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(201) Loss of Experience= 
  "Total Experience Loss due to Militant Losses (Exp Years)" 
 Units: Exp Years/Period 
  
(202) "Losses (Pieces per Period)"= 
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  "Lost in Battle (Pieces per Period)"+"Lost to Maintenance (Pieces per Period)" 
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(203) "Lossess (People per Period)"= 
  MAX(0,"Outgoing Militants (People)") 
 Units: People/Period 
 Fix max function with different first order control. MAX(0,("ISIS Militants (People)"-"Outgoing 
Militants (People)")/Time to Lose Militants) 
 
(209) "Militant Experience (Years)"= INTEG ( 
  Gain in Experience-Loss of Experience, 
   ("Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"*"ZScenario1: Starting Experience")) 
 Units: Exp Years 
  
(215) Militant Experience Gain= 
  "ISIS Militants (People)"*Experience gained per Period 
 Units: Exp Years/Period 
  
(227) Normal Ratio of Shura Councils to Population= 
  100000 
 Units: People/Council 
  
 
(229) Normal Size of Squad= 
  11 
 Units: People/Squad 
  
(230) Normal Time to Transition to Governance= 
  1 
 Units: Period 
 The Normal Time to transition from Controlled to Governance is 1 period, or 6 months. This is 
estimated based on the time it took ISIS to  
   establish governance in Ar Raqqah city from March 2013 to June 2013. The 
Normal time to Transition to Governance is modified by other  
   factors to determine the Effective time to Transition. 
 
(235) OpTempo Expenses= 
  Actual Military Actions*Cost per Military Action 
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(237) "Outgoing Expenses (Dollars per Period)"= 
  MAX(0,("Expenses before Attacks (Dollars per Period)"+OpTempo Expenses)) 
 Units: Dollars/Period 
 MAX(0,"ISIS Finances (Dollars)"-("Expenses before Attacks (Dollars per Period)"+OpTempo 
Expenses)) 
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(238) "Outgoing Militants (People)"= 
  "Deaths (People/Period)"+"Defections (People)"+"Detentions (People)" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(242) Period of Initial Finance= 
  1 
 Units: Period 
  
(244) Policy Intervention Time= 
  2013.5 
 Units: Period 
  
(245) "Population (People)"= INTEG ( 
  "Births & Immigration (People/Period)"-"Deaths, Recruiting & Emmigration 
(People/Period)", 
   Initial Population) 
 Units: People 
 Combined population of all Syrian and Iraqi Provinces. “Provinces of Syria”, Administrative 
Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last  
   modified September 22, 2004, accessed September 19th, 2014, 
http://www.statoids.com/usy.html. “Provinces of Iraq”, Administrative  
   Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last modified March 16, 2014, accessed 
September 19th, 2014, http://www.statoids.com/uiq.html. 
 
(246) "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)"= INTEG ( 
  "Gain in Control (People/Period)"-"Loss of Control (People/Period)", 
   ("Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"*"ZScenario1: Starting Population Controlled")) 
 Units: People 
  
(247) Population Controlled Lost due to Population Leaving= 
  "Deaths, Recruiting & Emmigration (People/Period)"*"% Controlled of Overall 
Population" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(248) Population Controlled Only= 
  "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)"-"Population Governed through 
Legitimacy (People)" 
 Units: People 
  
(249) "Population Governed Lost due to Loss of Control (People/Period)"= 
  "Loss of Control (People/Period)"*"% of Controlled Population that is Governed" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(250) "Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)"= INTEG ( 
  "Rate of Transition to Governance (People/Period)"-"Rate of Loss of Governance 
(People/Period)", 
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   0) 
 Units: People 
  
(251) "Population Outflow (People/Period)"= 
  "Civilian Deaths (People/Period)"+"Local Recruiting (People)"+"Refugees Leaving 
(People/Period)" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(252) Portion of Period spent Fighting Battle= 
  0.0055 
 Units: Period 
  
(254) "Proposition Switch (1 = On) 0"= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(256) Ransom Elimination= 
  0 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Normal value is 1. 0 means all ransom is eliminated. 
 
(261) "Rate of Councils Formed (Councils/Period)"= 
  (Desired Shura Councils-"Shura Councils (Councils)")/Time to Stand up a Shura Council 
 Units: Councils/Period 
  
(268) "Rate of Loss of Governance (People/Period)"= 
  "Population Governed Lost due to Loss of Control (People/Period)" 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(270) "Rate of Territory Gained (km^2/period)"= 
  "FLOT Movement Rate (FMR)"/Portion of Period spent Fighting Battle 
 Units: "km^2"/Period 
  
(271) "Rate of Territory Lost (km^2/Period)"= 
  0 
 Units: "km^2"/Period 
  
(272) "Rate of Transition to Governance (People/Period)"= 
  ("Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)"-"Population Governed through 
Legitimacy (People)")/Effective Time to Transition to Governance 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(292) "Remaining % of Population"= 
  "Population (People)"/Initial Population 
 Units: Percentage 
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(294) "Revenue (Dollars per Period)"= 
  "Donations (Dollars per Period)"+"Pre Donations Revenue (Dollars per Period)" 
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(296) "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(329) "Shura Councils (Councils)"= INTEG ( 
  "Rate of Councils Formed (Councils/Period)", 
   "Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)"/Normal Ratio of Shura 
Councils to Population) 
 Units: Councils 
 Initialized at the Starting Governed Population / Normal ratio of Shura Councils 
 
(336) Strikes per Day against Oil= 
  0 
 Units: Strikes/Period 
 Normal value is 0. Minimal is 5, Significant is 50, intensive is 250. 
 
(371) "Territory (km^2)"= 
  619308 
 Units: "km^2" 
 Includes all Provinces and Governates of Iraq and Syria. “Provinces of Syria”, Administrative 
Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last  
   modified September 22, 2004, accessed September 19th, 2014, 
http://www.statoids.com/usy.html. “Provinces of Iraq”, Administrative  
   Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last modified March 16, 2014, accessed 
September 19th, 2014, http://www.statoids.com/uiq.html. 
 
(372) "Territory ISIS Controlled (km^2)"= INTEG ( 
  "Rate of Territory Gained (km^2/period)"-"Rate of Territory Lost (km^2/Period)", 
   ("Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"*"ZScenario1: Starting Territory")) 
 Units: "km^2" 
  
(378) Time to Establish Control= 
  1 
 Units: Period 
  
(379) Time to Form Squads= 
  0.16 
 Units: Period 
 Ceylan Yeginsu, “ISIS Draws a Steady Stream of Recruits from Turkey,” nytimes.com,  
   http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/world/europe/turkey-is-a-steady-source-of-
isis-recruits.html, accessed October 25, 2014. (CHECK LONGER  
   TRAINING PERIOD) 
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(380) Time to Lose Militants= 
  1 
 Units: Period 
  
(384) Time to Stand up a Shura Council= 
  0.5 
 Units: Period 
 Estimated need source. 
 
(387) "Total Experience Loss due to Militant Losses (Exp Years)"= 
  (Average Militant Experience*"Outgoing Militants (People)") 
 Units: Exp Years/Period 
  
(394) US Airpower Support Step Height= 
  0 
 Units: Dmnl 
 1 is normal. 1.01 is minimal, 1.10 is significant and 1.5 is intensive. 
 
(395) USEquipmentModifier= 
  0.25 
 Units: Dmnl/Assets 
  
(399) ZScenario1 Starting Militants= 
  13200 
 Units: People 
  
(400) "ZScenario1: Starting Cash"= 
  Period of Initial Finance*(5e+006+("Expenses before Attacks (Dollars per Period)"*4)) 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(401) "ZScenario1: Starting Experience"= 
  39928 
 Units: Exp Years 
 2824 Escaped Detainees @ 10 years experience (28,240), 2600 Local Fighters @ 3 Years 
Epxerience (7800), 7776 Foreign Fighters at .5  
   Experience (3888) = 39928 
 
(402) "ZScenario1: Starting Population Controlled"= 
  0 
 Units: People 
  
(403) "ZScenario1: Starting Territory"= 
  0 
 Units: "km^2" 
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Revenue Sector Structure 
 
Ransom (Dollars
per Period)
Taxes (Dollars per
Period)
Criminal Activities
(Dollars per Period)
Black Market Oil Sales
(Dollars per Period)
Pre Donations Revenue
(Dollars per Period)
Estimated Ransom
per Period
Tax rate per
Governed Person
Criminal Activities per
Controlled or Governed
Person
Donations (Dollars
per Period)
Black Market Price per
Barrel (Price per Barrel)
Black Market Oil
Produced (Barrels per
Period)
Revenue (Dollars
per Period)
Donation Percentage
of all Revenue
<ISIS Oil Production
after Attacks>
Ransom
Elimination
Effect of Ransom
Policy
<Policy
Intervention Time>
<Time>
<Population Governed
through Legitimacy
(People)>
<Population Governed
through Legitimacy
(People)>
<Population
Controlled Only>
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Revenue Sector Equations 
(045) "Black Market Oil Produced (Barrels per Period)" = ISIS Oil Production after Attacks  
 Units: Barrels/Period 
 Prior to US airstrikes ISIS was producing between 25,000-40,000 barrels of oil a day (BPD) 
across a dozen oil wells. 
 
(077) "Criminal Activities (Dollars per Period)" = Criminal Activities per Controlled or Governed 
Person * ( Population Controlled Only + "Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)" 
                )  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(078) Criminal Activities per Controlled or Governed Person = 2.76 
 Units: Dollars/(Period*Person) 
 Converting these to $/Person/Period works out from a range of $1.62 to $3.90/Person/Period for 
Population Controlled. Taken at midpoint. 
 
(118) Effect of Ransom Policy = IF THEN ELSE ( Time > Policy Intervention Time , Ransom 
Elimination , 1)  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(129) Estimated Ransom per Period = 6e+006 
 Units: Dollars/Period 
 Assuming a simple $2M/Month for ransoms results in $6M/Period. 
 
(180) ISIS Oil Production after Attacks = ISIS Oil Production before Attacks - Effect of Attacks on Oil 
Production  
 Units: Barrels/Period 
  
(191) "Black Market Oil Sales (Dollars per Period)" = "Black Market Price per Barrel (Price per 
Barrel)" * "Black Market Oil Produced (Barrels per Period)" 
            
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(192) "Black Market Price per Barrel (Price per Barrel)" = 45 
 Units: Dollars/Barrels 
  
(193) Donation Percentage of all Revenue = 0.04 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(194) "Donations (Dollars per Period)" = "Pre Donations Revenue (Dollars per Period)" * Donation 
Percentage of all Revenue  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(244) Policy Intervention Time = 2013.5 
 Units: Period 
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(248) Population Controlled Only = "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" - "Population 
Governed through Legitimacy (People)"  
 Units: People 
  
(250) "Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)" = INTEG( "Rate of Transition to 
Governance (People/Period)" - "Rate of Loss of Governance (People/Period)" 
                , 0)  
 Units: People 
  
(253) "Pre Donations Revenue (Dollars per Period)" = "Taxes (Dollars per Period)" + "Ransom 
(Dollars per Period)" + "Criminal Activities (Dollars per Period)" 
           + "Black Market Oil Sales (Dollars per Period)"  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(255) "Ransom (Dollars per Period)" = Estimated Ransom per Period * Effect of Ransom Policy  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(256) Ransom Elimination = 0 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Normal value is 1. 0 means all ransom is eliminated. 
 
(294) "Revenue (Dollars per Period)" = "Donations (Dollars per Period)" + "Pre Donations Revenue 
(Dollars per Period)"  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(369) Tax rate per Governed Person = 15.995 
 Units: Dollars/(Period*Person) 
 Dividing this amount into the estimated Population governed for the 2014 Period results in a 
range from $11.99-$20 Person/Period for  
   Population Governed. 
 
(370) "Taxes (Dollars per Period)" = Tax rate per Governed Person * "Population Governed through 
Legitimacy (People)"  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
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Expense Sector Structure 
Administration &
Governance Expense
(Dollars per Period)
Military Procurement
(Dollars per Period)
Media Border Security &
Other Expenses (Dollars per
Period)
Military Actions Paid
For (Dollars per Period)
Detention Benefits
(Dollars per Period)
Death Benefits
(Dollars per Period)
Expenses before Attacks
(Dollars per Period)
Payroll (Dollars per
Period)
<ISIS Militants
(People)>
Payroll (Dollars per
Period per Person)
Administrative Costs
(Dollars/Person/Period)
<Revenue (Dollars
per Period)>
Military
Procurement Budget
Media Border Security
& Other Budget
<Population Gover
ned through Legiti
macy (People)>
<Population Controll
ed by Coercive Pow
er (People)>
<ISIS Detainees
(People)>
<Killed ISIS
Militants (People)>
<Actual Military
Actions>
Expenses including
Attacks (Dollars/Period)
<Cost per Military
Action>
Expenses
Activation
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Expense Sector Equations 
 
(022) Actual Military Actions = IF THEN ELSE ( Capacity for Military Actions based on Budget > 
Capability of Military Actions based on Squads , Capability of Military Actions based on Squads 
           , Capacity for Military Actions based on Budget )  
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(026) "Administration & Governance Expense (Dollars per Period)" = ( "Population Governed through 
Legitimacy (People)" + "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" 
           ) * "Administrative Costs (Dollars/Person/Period)"  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
 
(076) Cost per Military Action = 2700 
 Units: Dollars/Military Action 
 Analysis showed that for each $2700 transferred to a sector command, an AQI attack was 
launched. This cost includes not only direct costs  
   of the attack, but indirect costs of all the other factors necessary for AQI to 
peform in that sector outside Media, Courts,  
   Administration. Furthermore, there was a strong correlation (.66) between the rate 
of fund flows increasing or decreasing and corresponding  
   changes in the pace of attacks. RAND 57-69. 
 
(090) "Death Benefits (Dollars per Period)" = "Killed ISIS Militants (People)" * "Payroll (Dollars per 
Period per Person)"  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
 Still needs to have the organizational reset barriers put in 2007 & 2013. 
 
(105) "Detention Benefits (Dollars per Period)" = ( "ISIS Detainees (People)" * "Payroll (Dollars per 
Period per Person)" ) * ( 0 + Expenses Activation 
                )  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
 Still needs to have the organizational reset barriers put in 2007 & 2013. 
 
(131) Expenses Activation = STEP ( 1, 2014)  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(132) "Expenses before Attacks (Dollars per Period)" = "Administration & Governance Expense 
(Dollars per Period)" + "Death Benefits (Dollars per Period)" 
           + "Detention Benefits (Dollars per Period)" + "Media Border Security & Other Expenses (Dollars 
per Period)" + "Military Procurement (Dollars per Period)" 
           + "Payroll (Dollars per Period)"  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(135) "Expenses including Attacks (Dollars/Period)" = "Expenses before Attacks (Dollars per Period)" 
+ "Military Actions Paid For (Dollars per Period)" 
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 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(175) "ISIS Detainees (People)" = INTEG( "Rate of Detentions (People/Period)" - "Rate of Escape or 
Release (People/Period)" , 2890)  
 Units: People 
 Set as 0 update to final number at start 
 
(178) "ISIS Militants (People)" = INTEG( "Additions (People per Period)" - "Lossess (People per 
Period)" , ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" * ZScenario1 Starting Militants 
                ) )  
 Units: People 
 Scenario Determines starting value. 
 
(185) "Killed ISIS Militants (People)" = INTEG( "Rate of Deaths (People/Period)" , 0)  
 Units: People 
 Adjust initial level based on starting time of model. 
 
(190) "Administrative Costs (Dollars/Person/Period)" = 0.185 
 Units: Dollars/(Period*Person) 
 This implies a cost per ControlledPerson for overhead administration of $.185 per 
ControlledPerson/Period. RAND,40. 
 
(208) "Media Border Security & Other Budget" = 0.06 
 Units: Dmnl 
 All other expenses were combined into a single bucket that amounts to 6% of all revenue. RAND  
 
(211) "Military Actions Paid For (Dollars per Period)" = Cost per Military Action * Actual Military 
Actions  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(214) "Media Border Security & Other Expenses (Dollars per Period)" = "Revenue (Dollars per 
Period)" * "Media Border Security & Other Budget"  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(218) "Military Procurement (Dollars per Period)" = "Revenue (Dollars per Period)" * Military 
Procurement Budget  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(219) Military Procurement Budget = 0.1 
 Units: Dmnl 
 According to the RAND analysis purchases related to military procurement – heavy weapons, 
ammunition, logistics and maintenance ran about  
   10% of all revenues. RAND  
 
(239) "Payroll (Dollars per Period per Person)" = 366 
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 Units: Dollars/(Period*Person) 
 RAND 45-48. Includes direct pay to militant of $41/month and dependent (on averaqge one) pay 
of $20/month for $61/month or $366/period. 
 
(240) "Payroll (Dollars per Period)" = "ISIS Militants (People)" * "Payroll (Dollars per Period per 
Person)"  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(246) "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" = INTEG( "Gain in Control 
(People/Period)" - "Loss of Control (People/Period)" , ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" 
           * "ZScenario1: Starting Population Controlled" ) )  
 Units: People 
  
(250) "Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)" = INTEG( "Rate of Transition to 
Governance (People/Period)" - "Rate of Loss of Governance (People/Period)" 
                , 0)  
 Units: People 
  
(294) "Revenue (Dollars per Period)" = "Donations (Dollars per Period)" + "Pre Donations Revenue 
(Dollars per Period)"  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
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Militant Recruiting & Loss Sector Structure 
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Detentions
(People)
Deaths
(People/Period)
Defections
(People)
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(Dollars)>
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Local vs Foreign
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Remaining Recruits on
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Militant Recruiting & Loss Sector Equations 
(010) "% of All Population that Can Ever Be Recruited" = Cumm Total of Recruitable Population / 
Actual Max Recruiting  
 Units: Percentage 
  
(014) "% of Local Population Recruitable Recruited" = ZIDZ ( Total Ever Recruited , Cumm Total of 
Recruitable Population )  
 Units: Percentage 
  
(015) "% of Losses that are Deaths" = 0.43 
 Units: Fraction 
 Derived from research need to finalize. 
 
(016) "% of Losses that are Detentions" = 0.57 
 Units: Fraction 
 Derived from research. Need to confirm with causal factors. 
 
(018) "% Remaining Recruits" = "Total Foreign Recruits (People)" / Starting Worldwide Population  
 Units: Percentage 
  
(021) Actual Max Recruiting = Max Ever Recruiting * "Remaining % of Population"  
 Units: People 
  
(023) Actual Recruits per Suicide Attack = Normal Recruits Inspired per Suicide Attack * Effect of 
Experience on Recruiting Efforts * Effect of Remaining Recruits on Recruiting Efforts 
            
 Units: People/Military Action 
  
(034) Average Experience of Escaped Detainee = 10 
 Units: Exp Years/Person 
 Set at 10 need actual vaule to finish. 
 
(035) Average Experience of Foreign Recruit = 1 
 Units: Exp Years/Person 
 Set at 1 update for final. 
 
(036) Average Experience of Local Recruit = 3 
 Units: Exp Years/Person 
 Set at 3 update for final. 
 
(037) Average Militant Experience = ZIDZ ( "Militant Experience (Years)" , "ISIS Militants 
(People)" )  
 Units: Exp Years/Person 
  
(038) Bankruptcy Switch = IF THEN ELSE ( "ISIS Finances (Dollars)" < -100000, 0, 1)  
© Tim Clancy MAR 2015                               Contact: timothy.clancy.nv@gmail.com 86
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(082) Cumm Total of Recruitable Population = INTEG( Increase in Cumm Total of Recruitable , 0)  
 Units: People 
  
(085) Current Territory Recruitable Population = "ZScenario1: Table for Cumm Total Recruitable 
Population based on Location of ISIS on Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
           )  
 Units: People 
  
(091) "Deaths (People/Period)" = ( Red Infantry Final Losses * "% of Losses that are Deaths" ) / Time 
to Realize Losses  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(096) "Defections (People)" = 0 
 Units: People/Period 
  
(106) "Detentions (People)" = ( Red Infantry Final Losses * "% of Losses that are Detentions" ) / Time 
to Realize Losses  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(110) Disable Local Recruiting = 1 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Normal value is 1, set to 0 to test Proposition 4. 
 
(113) "Eff of % of All Population that can ever be Recruited" = Table for Effect of Remaining Recruits 
on Recruiting Efforts ( "% of All Population that Can Ever Be Recruited" 
           )  
 Units: Percentage 
  
(115) Effect of Experience on Recruiting Efforts = Table for Effect of Militant Experience on Foreign 
Recruiting Efforts ( Average Militant Experience 
           )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(119) "Effect of Remaining Recruits on Local Recruiting (Opposition & Militant)" = Table for Effect 
of Remaining Recruits on Recruiting Efforts ( "% of Local Population Recruitable Recruited" 
           )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(120) Effect of Remaining Recruits on Recruiting Efforts = Table for Effect of Remaining Recruits on 
Recruiting Efforts ( "% Remaining Recruits" )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(128) "Escaped Detainees Joining ISIS (People)" = "Rate of Escape or Release (People/Period)" * 
Percentage of Escaped or Released Detainees Joining ISIS 
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 Units: People/Period 
  
(137) Experience gain from Joining Militants = ( Average Experience of Escaped Detainee * "Escaped 
Detainees Joining ISIS (People)" ) + ( "Foreign Recruiting (People)" 
           * Average Experience of Foreign Recruit ) + ( "Local Recruiting (People)" * Average Experience 
of Local Recruit )  
 Units: Exp Years/Period 
  
(138) Experience gained per Period = 0.5 
 Units: Exp Years/(Period*Person) 
  
(142) "Foreign Recruiting (People)" = ( ( Actual Recruits per Suicide Attack * "Suicide Actions 
(Military Actions/Period)" ) * Foreign Recruiting Eliminated 
           ) * Bankruptcy Switch  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(143) Foreign Recruiting Eliminated = 1 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Normal is 1. 0 means foreign recruiting is completely eliminated. 
 
(156) "Incoming Militants (People)" = "Local Recruiting (People)" + "Foreign Recruiting (People)" + 
"Escaped Detainees Joining ISIS (People)"  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(162) Increase in Cumm Total of Recruitable = Increase in Militant Recruitable Population  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(164) Increase in Local Forces = ( "Local Recruiting (People)" + "Escaped Detainees Joining ISIS 
(People)" )  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(165) Increase in Militant Recruitable Population = ( Current Territory Recruitable Population * "Eff 
of % of All Population that can ever be Recruited" 
           ) / Time for Population to become Recruitable  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(166) Increase in Total Ever Recruited = Reduction in Recruitable Population  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(169) Inflow of Recruits = "Foreign Recruiting (People)"  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(171) Initial Recruitable Population = 50662 
 Units: People 
 Pull from the Scenario Builder Cumm Total of Recruitable Population. 
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(174) ISIS Controlled Population = ( "Baseline Switch (1 = On)" * "ZBaseline: Table for Percentage of 
Population Controlled based on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" 
           ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map ) * Total Population ) + ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = 
On)" * "ZScenario1: Table for Percentage of Population Controlled Based on Location of ISIS on 
Territorial Map" 
                ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map ) * Total Population )  
 Units: People 
  
(175) "ISIS Detainees (People)" = INTEG( "Rate of Detentions (People/Period)" - "Rate of Escape or 
Release (People/Period)" , 2890)  
 Units: People 
 Set as 0 update to final number at start 
 
(176) "ISIS Finances (Dollars)" = INTEG( "Incoming Revenue (Dollars per Period)" - "Outgoing 
Expenses (Dollars per Period)" , "ZScenario1: Starting Cash" 
           )  
 Units: Dollars 
 ("Baseline Switch (1 = On)"*(Capability of Military Actions based on Squads*Cost per 
Attack))+("Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"*"ZScenario1:  
   Starting Cash") 
 
(178) "ISIS Militants (People)" = INTEG( "Additions (People per Period)" - "Lossess (People per 
Period)" , ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" * ZScenario1 Starting Militants 
                ) )  
 Units: People 
 Scenario Determines starting value. 
 
(185) "Killed ISIS Militants (People)" = INTEG( "Rate of Deaths (People/Period)" , 0)  
 Units: People 
 Adjust initial level based on starting time of model. 
 
(189) "Local Recruiting (People)" = ( Recruitable Population of Controlled Population * Local 
Recruiting Rate * "Effect of Remaining Recruits on Local Recruiting (Opposition & Militant)" 
           ) * Disable Local Recruiting  
 Units: People/Period 
 Must have territorial control to begin local recruiting. 
 
(198) Local Recruiting Rate = Table for Effect of Militant Experience on Local Recruiting Efforts 
( Average Militant Experience ) * Bankruptcy Switch  
 Units: Fraction 
 Derived from AQI implied local recruiting patterns. Actual source (perhaps Accidental Guerilla 
effect) would be better. 
 
(199) Local vs Foreign Forces = ZIDZ ( Total Recruited , ( Total Recruited + "Total Foreign Recruits 
(People)" ) )  
© Tim Clancy MAR 2015                               Contact: timothy.clancy.nv@gmail.com 89
 Units: Percentage 
  
(206) Max Ever Recruiting = 3.39502e+006 
 Units: People 
  
(209) "Militant Experience (Years)" = INTEG( Gain in Experience - Loss of Experience , ( "Scenario 1 
Switch (1 = On)" * "ZScenario1: Starting Experience" 
                ) )  
 Units: Exp Years 
  
(215) Militant Experience Gain = "ISIS Militants (People)" * Experience gained per Period  
 Units: Exp Years/Period 
  
(228) Normal Recruits Inspired per Suicide Attack = 18 
 Units: People/Military Action 
 Need source for final. Read 26 recruits per suicide attack, this should be a higher end. 
 
(238) "Outgoing Militants (People)" = "Deaths (People/Period)" + "Defections (People)" + "Detentions 
(People)"  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(241) Percentage of Escaped or Released Detainees Joining ISIS = 1 
 Units: Fraction 
 Set at 1 check estiamte for final. 
 
(245) "Population (People)" = INTEG( "Births & Immigration (People/Period)" - "Deaths, Recruiting 
& Emmigration (People/Period)" , Initial Population  
           )  
 Units: People 
 Combined population of all Syrian and Iraqi Provinces. “Provinces of Syria”, Administrative 
Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last  
   modified September 22, 2004, accessed September 19th, 2014, 
http://www.statoids.com/usy.html. “Provinces of Iraq”, Administrative  
   Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last modified March 16, 2014, accessed 
September 19th, 2014, http://www.statoids.com/uiq.html. 
 
(250) "Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)" = INTEG( "Rate of Transition to 
Governance (People/Period)" - "Rate of Loss of Governance (People/Period)" 
                , 0)  
 Units: People 
  
(262) "Rate of Deaths (People/Period)" = "Deaths (People/Period)"  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(263) "Rate of Detentions (People/Period)" = "Detentions (People)"  
 Units: People/Period 
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(264) "Rate of Escape or Release (People/Period)" = "ISIS Detainees (People)" * "Rate of 
Escape/Released Detainees"  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(265) "Rate of Escape/Released Detainees" = 0.5 
 Units: 1/Period 
  
 
(267) Rate of Local Opposition Fighters Joining Uprising = Diehards joining Uprising + ( Effect of 
Ungarrision Ratio on Recruiting Rate * Current Territory Recruitable Population 
                ) / Time for Uprising to Form  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(269) Rate of Recruiting to ISIS = "Foreign Recruiting (People)"  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(274) Recruitable Population of Controlled Population = "ZScenario1: Table for Recruitable 
Population based on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" (  
           Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map )  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(275) "Recruits + Casualities" = "ISIS Detainees (People)" + "Killed ISIS Militants (People)" + Total 
Recruited  
 Units: People 
  
(283) Red Infantry Final Losses = ( Red Infantry Initial Losses - ( Red Infantry Initial Losses * 
"Infantry Recovery (People/Period)" ) )  
 Units: People 
  
(287) Reduction in Recruitable Population = "Local Recruiting (People)" + Rate of Local Opposition 
Fighters Joining Uprising  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(292) "Remaining % of Population" = "Population (People)" / Initial Population  
 Units: Percentage 
  
(293) Remaining Recruitable Population = INTEG( Increase in Militant Recruitable Population - 
Reduction in Recruitable Population , Initial Recruitable Population 
           )  
 Units: People 
  
(334) Starting Worldwide Population = 100000 
 Units: People 
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(340) "Suicide Actions (Military Actions/Period)" = Actual Military Actions * "% of Actions that are 
Suicide Attacks"  
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(348) Table for Effect of Militant Experience on Foreign Recruiting Efforts ( [(0,0)-
(5,2)],(0,0.5),(1,0.75),(2,0.9),(3,1),(4,1.25),(5,1.5) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(349) Table for Effect of Militant Experience on Local Recruiting Efforts ( [(0,0)-
(5,0.3)],(0,0.01),(1,0.03),(2,0.06),(3,0.09),(4,0.11),(5,0.12) ) 
 Units: Fraction 
  
(353) Table for Effect of Remaining Recruits on Recruiting Efforts ( [(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,1),(0.1,1),(0.2,1),(0.3,1),(0.4,1),(0.5,1),(0.6,0.95),(0.7,0.85) 
            ,(0.8,0.65),(0.9,0.25),(0.95,0.15),(0.97,0.07),(0.99,0.01),(1,0),(1,0) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 This is a modeler created variable. 
 
(358) Table for Effect of Total vs Max Recruitable ( [(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,1),(0.1,1),(0.2,1),(0.3,1),(0.4,1),(0.5,1),(0.6,0.95),(0.7,0.85),(0.8,0.65),(0.9,0.25) 
            ,(0.95,0.15),(0.97,0.07),(0.99,0.01),(1,0),(1,0) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(375) Time for Population to become Recruitable = 1 
 Units: Period 
  
(380) Time to Lose Militants = 1 
 Units: Period 
  
(381) Time to Realize Losses = 1 
 Units: Period 
  
(386) Total Ever Recruited = INTEG( Increase in Total Ever Recruited , 0)  
 Units: People 
  
(387) "Total Experience Loss due to Militant Losses (Exp Years)" = ( Average Militant Experience * 
"Outgoing Militants (People)" )  
 Units: Exp Years/Period 
  
(388) "Total Foreign Recruits (People)" = INTEG( Inflow of Recruits , 0)  
 Units: People 
  
(390) Total Recruited = INTEG( Increase in Local Forces , 0)  
 Units: People 
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(396) Worldwide Recruitable Population = INTEG( - Rate of Recruiting to ISIS , Starting Worldwide 
Population )  
 Units: People 
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Heavy Weapon (AFV & IFV) Sector Structure 
 
Additions (Pieces
per Period)
Losses (Pieces per
Period)Lost in Battle (Pieces
per Period)
Lost to Maintenance
(Pieces per Period)
<Red HW Final
Losses>
<Heavy Weapons
Looted>
Time to Realize
Losses
 
Heavy Weapon (AFV & IFV) Sector Equations  
(025) "Additions (Pieces per Period)" = Heavy Weapons Looted  
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(151) Heavy Weapons Looted = ( ( Blue HW Initial Losses * Scavenging Rate of Heavy Weapons ) + 
( Blue Artillery Initial Losses * Scavenging Rate of Heavy Weapons 
                ) ) / "Time to Repair & Operate"  
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(197) "Heavy Weapons Purchased (Pieces per Period)" = 0 
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(202) "Losses (Pieces per Period)" = "Lost in Battle (Pieces per Period)" + "Lost to Maintenance 
(Pieces per Period)"  
 Units: Pieces/Period 
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(204) "Lost in Battle (Pieces per Period)" = Red HW Final Losses / Time to Realize Losses  
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(205) "Lost to Maintenance (Pieces per Period)" = 0 
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(278) Red HW Final Losses = ( Red HW Initial Losses - ( Red HW Initial Losses * HW Recovery ) )  
 Units: Pieces 
  
(381) Time to Realize Losses = 1 
 Units: Period 
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OpTempo Attacks Sector Structure 
<ISIS Finances
(Dollars)>
<ISIS Squads> Normal Military
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Actual Military
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Attacks (Dollars
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Indirect: IED, VBIED
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Suicide Actions
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Actions/Period)
Indirect Attacks
(Attacks/Period)
All Other Attacks
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Experience on Combat
Multiplier
ISIS Morale
Multiplier
Blue Morale
Multiplier
<Average Militant
Experience>
Combat Multiplier
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OpTempo Attacks Sector Equations 
 
(007) "% of Actions that are Ethnic Cleansing" = 0.1 
 Units: Percentage 
  
(008) "% of Actions that are Indirect: IED, VBIED or SVIED" = 0.1 
 Units: Percentage 
  
(009) "% of Actions that are Suicide Attacks" = 0.1 
 Units: Percentage 
  
(019) Actual Garrison = MIN ( "Desired Garrison & Police Forces" , Max Garrison Allocation )  
 Units: People 
  
(022) Actual Military Actions = IF THEN ELSE ( Capacity for Military Actions based on Budget > 
Capability of Military Actions based on Squads , Capability of Military Actions based on Squads 
           , Capacity for Military Actions based on Budget )  
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(027) All Other Attacks = Actual Military Actions - "Ethnic Cleansing Actions (Military 
Actions/Period)" - "Indirect Attacks (Attacks/Period)"  
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(037) Average Militant Experience = ZIDZ ( "Militant Experience (Years)" , "ISIS Militants 
(People)" )  
 Units: Exp Years/Person 
  
(050) Blue Combat Multiplier = 1 + ( Blue Morale Multiplier + Blue Combat Multiplier from 
Experience )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(051) Blue Combat Multiplier from Experience = Table for Effect of Experience on Combat Multiplier 
( Situational Blue Experience )  
 Units: Dmnl 
 Table for Effect of Experience on Combat Multiplier(Average Blue Experience) 
 
(065) Blue Morale = "ZScenario1: Table of Blue Morale Based on ISIS Location on Territorial Map" 
( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map ) + Morale Effect 
            
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(066) Blue Morale Multiplier = Blue Morale  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(067) Budget Period = 1 
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 Units: Period 
  
(068) Capability of Military Actions based on Squads = ISIS Squads * Normal Military Capability of 
Squads  
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(069) Capacity for Military Actions based on Budget = ( OpTempo Budget / Cost per Military Action ) 
/ Time for Military Actions  
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(074) Combat Multiplier from Experience = Table for Effect of Experience on Combat Multiplier 
( Average Militant Experience )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(076) Cost per Military Action = 2700 
 Units: Dollars/Military Action 
 Analysis showed that for each $2700 transferred to a sector command, an AQI attack was 
launched. This cost includes not only direct costs  
   of the attack, but indirect costs of all the other factors necessary for AQI to 
peform in that sector outside Media, Courts,  
   Administration. Furthermore, there was a strong correlation (.66) between the rate 
of fund flows increasing or decreasing and corresponding  
   changes in the pace of attacks. RAND 57-69. 
 
(092) Deaths per Ethnic Cleansing = 25 
 Units: People/Military Action 
 Check source. 
 
(093) Deaths per Suicide Action = 10 
 Units: People/Military Action 
  
(101) Desired Cash on Hand = 250000 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(104) Desired Squads = ( "ISIS Militants (People)" - Actual Garrison ) / Normal Size of Squad  
 Units: Squads 
  
(130) "Ethnic Cleansing Actions (Military Actions/Period)" = Actual Military Actions * "% of Actions 
that are Ethnic Cleansing"  
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(132) "Expenses before Attacks (Dollars per Period)" = "Administration & Governance Expense 
(Dollars per Period)" + "Death Benefits (Dollars per Period)" 
           + "Detention Benefits (Dollars per Period)" + "Media Border Security & Other Expenses (Dollars 
per Period)" + "Military Procurement (Dollars per Period)" 
           + "Payroll (Dollars per Period)"  
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 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(133) Ethnic Cleansing Deaths = "Ethnic Cleansing Actions (Military Actions/Period)" * Deaths per 
Ethnic Cleansing  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(134) Ethnic Cleansing Refugees = "Ethnic Cleansing Actions (Military Actions/Period)" * Refugees 
from Ethnic Cleansing  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(167) "Indirect Attacks (Attacks/Period)" = Actual Military Actions * "% of Actions that are Indirect: 
IED, VBIED or SVIED"  
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(173) ISIS Combat Multiplier = 1 + ( Combat Multiplier from Experience + ISIS Morale Multiplier )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(176) "ISIS Finances (Dollars)" = INTEG( "Incoming Revenue (Dollars per Period)" - "Outgoing 
Expenses (Dollars per Period)" , "ZScenario1: Starting Cash" 
           )  
 Units: Dollars 
 ("Baseline Switch (1 = On)"*(Capability of Military Actions based on Squads*Cost per 
Attack))+("Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)"*"ZScenario1:  
   Starting Cash") 
 
(178) "ISIS Militants (People)" = INTEG( "Additions (People per Period)" - "Lossess (People per 
Period)" , ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" * ZScenario1 Starting Militants 
                ) )  
 Units: People 
 Scenario Determines starting value. 
 
(179) ISIS Morale Multiplier = 0.125 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Need data 
 
(182) ISIS Squads = INTEG( "Change in Squads (Squads/Period)" , "ISIS Militants (People)" / Normal 
Size of Squad )  
 Units: Squads 
 Initialized at the starting Initial Number of Militants divided by the Normal Size of Squads 
 
(226) Normal Military Capability of Squads = 3 
 Units: Military Actions/(Period*Squad) 
 1 every 2 months is normal 
 
(229) Normal Size of Squad = 11 
 Units: People/Squad 
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(234) OpTempo Budget = MAX ( 0, ( "ISIS Finances (Dollars)" - Desired Cash on Hand ) - "Expenses 
before Attacks (Dollars per Period)" * Budget Period  
           )  
 Units: Dollars 
  
(235) OpTempo Expenses = Actual Military Actions * Cost per Military Action  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(236) "OpTempo Expenses (Dollars per Period)" = OpTempo Expenses  
 Units: Dollars/Period 
  
(288) Refguees per Suicide Action = 25 
 Units: People/Military Action 
  
(290) Refugees from Ethnic Cleansing = 250 
 Units: People/Military Action 
  
(330) Situational Blue Experience = "ZScenario1: Table of Blue Experienced based on ISIS Location 
on Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
           ) + Experience Effect  
 Units: Exp Years 
  
(338) Suicide Action Deaths = "Suicide Actions (Military Actions/Period)" * Deaths per Suicide 
Action  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(339) Suicide Action Refugees = "Suicide Actions (Military Actions/Period)" * Refguees per Suicide 
Action  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(340) "Suicide Actions (Military Actions/Period)" = Actual Military Actions * "% of Actions that are 
Suicide Attacks"  
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(347) Table for Effect of Experience on Combat Multiplier ( [(0,-0.3)-(4,1)],(0,-0.25),(0.5,-
0.125),(1,0),(1.5,0.125),(2,0.25),(2.5,0.5),(3,0.75) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(374) Time for Military Actions = 1 
 Units: Periods 
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Governance & Population Sector Structure 
 
<Population Controll
ed by Coercive Pow
er (People)>
<Population Gover
ned through Legiti
macy (People)>
Normal Time to
Transition to Governance
Effective Time to
Transition to Governance
Table for Effect of Shura
Councils on Transition Time
<Shura Councils
(Councils)>
Desired Shura
Councils
Effect of Shura Council
Sufficiency on Transition to
Governance
Normal Ratio of Shura
Councils to Population
Ungoverned
Population
<Population
(People)>
<Population Controll
ed by Coercive Pow
er (People)>
% Controlled of
Overall Population
<Local Recruiting
(People)> Refugees Leaving
(People/Period)
Population Outflow
(People/Period)
Civilian Deaths
(People/Period)
<Population Gover
ned through Legiti
macy (People)>
% Governed of
Overall Population
% of Controlled
Population that is
Governed
<Ethnic Cleansing
Deaths>
<Ethnic Cleansing
Refugees>
<Suicide Action
Deaths>
<Suicide Action
Refugees>
Civilians
Killed
(People)Rate of Civilian
Deaths
Refugees
(People)Rate of Civilian
Refugees
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Governance & Population Sector Equations 
 
(005) "% Controlled of Overall Population" = ZIDZ ( "Population Controlled by Coercive Power 
(People)" , "Population (People)" )  
 Units: Fraction 
  
(006) "% Governed of Overall Population" = ZIDZ ( "Population Governed through Legitimacy 
(People)" , "Population (People)" )  
 Units: Fraction 
  
(012) "% of Controlled Population that is Governed" = ZIDZ ( "Population Governed through 
Legitimacy (People)" , "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" 
           )  
 Units: Fraction 
  
(072) "Civilian Deaths (People/Period)" = Ethnic Cleansing Deaths + Suicide Action Deaths  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(073) "Civilians Killed (People)" = INTEG( Rate of Civilian Deaths , 0)  
 Units: People 
  
(103) Desired Shura Councils = ( "Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)" + Ungoverned 
Population ) / Normal Ratio of Shura Councils to Population 
            
 Units: Councils 
  
(124) Effective Time to Transition to Governance = Normal Time to Transition to Governance * Effect 
of Shura Council Sufficiency on Transition to Governance 
            
 Units: Period 
  
(133) Ethnic Cleansing Deaths = "Ethnic Cleansing Actions (Military Actions/Period)" * Deaths per 
Ethnic Cleansing  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(134) Ethnic Cleansing Refugees = "Ethnic Cleansing Actions (Military Actions/Period)" * Refugees 
from Ethnic Cleansing  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(189) "Local Recruiting (People)" = ( Recruitable Population of Controlled Population * Local 
Recruiting Rate * "Effect of Remaining Recruits on Local Recruiting (Opposition & Militant)" 
           ) * Disable Local Recruiting  
 Units: People/Period 
 Must have territorial control to begin local recruiting. 
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(195) Effect of Shura Council Sufficiency on Transition to Governance = Table for Effect of Shura 
Councils on Transition Time ( ZIDZ ( "Shura Councils (Councils)" 
                , Desired Shura Councils ) )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(227) Normal Ratio of Shura Councils to Population = 100000 
 Units: People/Council 
  
 
(230) Normal Time to Transition to Governance = 1 
 Units: Period 
 The Normal Time to transition from Controlled to Governance is 1 period, or 6 months. This is 
estimated based on the time it took ISIS to  
   establish governance in Ar Raqqah city from March 2013 to June 2013. The 
Normal time to Transition to Governance is modified by other  
   factors to determine the Effective time to Transition. 
 
(245) "Population (People)" = INTEG( "Births & Immigration (People/Period)" - "Deaths, Recruiting 
& Emmigration (People/Period)" , Initial Population  
           )  
 Units: People 
 Combined population of all Syrian and Iraqi Provinces. “Provinces of Syria”, Administrative 
Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last  
   modified September 22, 2004, accessed September 19th, 2014, 
http://www.statoids.com/usy.html. “Provinces of Iraq”, Administrative  
   Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last modified March 16, 2014, accessed 
September 19th, 2014, http://www.statoids.com/uiq.html. 
 
(246) "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" = INTEG( "Gain in Control 
(People/Period)" - "Loss of Control (People/Period)" , ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" 
           * "ZScenario1: Starting Population Controlled" ) )  
 Units: People 
  
(250) "Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)" = INTEG( "Rate of Transition to 
Governance (People/Period)" - "Rate of Loss of Governance (People/Period)" 
                , 0)  
 Units: People 
  
(251) "Population Outflow (People/Period)" = "Civilian Deaths (People/Period)" + "Local Recruiting 
(People)" + "Refugees Leaving (People/Period)"  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(259) Rate of Civilian Deaths = "Civilian Deaths (People/Period)"  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(260) Rate of Civilian Refugees = "Refugees Leaving (People/Period)"  
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 Units: People/Period 
  
(289) "Refugees (People)" = INTEG( Rate of Civilian Refugees , 0)  
 Units: People 
  
(291) "Refugees Leaving (People/Period)" = Ethnic Cleansing Refugees + Suicide Action Refugees  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(329) "Shura Councils (Councils)" = INTEG( "Rate of Councils Formed (Councils/Period)" , 
"Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)" / Normal Ratio of Shura Councils to Population 
                )  
 Units: Councils 
 Initialized at the Starting Governed Population / Normal ratio of Shura Councils 
 
(338) Suicide Action Deaths = "Suicide Actions (Military Actions/Period)" * Deaths per Suicide 
Action  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(339) Suicide Action Refugees = "Suicide Actions (Military Actions/Period)" * Refguees per Suicide 
Action  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(354) Table for Effect of Shura Councils on Transition Time ( [(0,0)-(1,10)],(0,10),(1,1) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(393) Ungoverned Population = "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" - "Population 
Governed through Legitimacy (People)"  
 Units: People 
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Territory & Scenario Sector Structure 
 
<Territory
(km^2)>
<Territory ISIS
Controlled (km^2)>
% of Territory
Controlled by ISIS
Total Population
Available Oil
Production
<Population
(People)>
Current Location of
ISIS on Territorial Map
ZBaseline: Table for the Percentage
of Oil Production based on Location
of ISIS on Territorial Map
Oil Production before
Attacks & Inefficiencies
Add attack function to
simulate degradation of oil
production.
ZBaseline: Table for Percentage of
Population Controlled based on
Location of ISIS on Territorial Map
ISIS Controlled
Population
<Population Control
led by Coercive Pow
er (People)>
Change in Controlled
Population
ZScernario1: Table for the
Percentage of Oil Production based
on Location of ISIS on Territorial
Map
ZScenario1: Table for Percentage of
Population Controlled Based on
Location of ISIS on Territorial Map
<Scenario 1 Switch
(1 = On)>
<Baseline Switch
(1 = On)>
<Scenario 1 Switch
(1 = On)>
<Baseline Switch
(1 = On)>
ISIS Oil Production
after Attacks
Effect of Attacks on
Oil Production
OIL PRODUCTION
BY SCENARIO
POPULATION
BY SCENARIO
Terrain Types (1) Open, (2)
Mixed, (3) Rough, (4) Urban, (5)
Mountain) by scenario
Type of Battle (1) Breakthrough, (2)
Hasty Defense, (3) Prepared Defense, (4)
Deliberate Defense, (5) Fortified Defense,
(6) Meeting
Type of Battle
Type of Terrain
BLUE FORCES
BY SCENARIO
Blue HW Engaged Blue Infantry
Engaged
Blue Artillery
Engaged
ISIS Inefficiencies
ISIS Oil Production
before Attacks
ZScernario1: Table for the Terrain
Type Vased on Location of ISIS
on Territorial Map
ZScernario1: Table for Battle
Type based on Location of ISIS
on Territorial Map
ZScenario1: Table for Strategic
Surprise Based on Location of
ISIS on Territorial Map
Strategic Surprise
Factor
ZScenario1: Table of Blue HW
Engaged based on Location of
ISIS on Territorial Map
ZScenario1: Table of Blue Infantry
Engaged based on Location of
ISIS on Territorial Map
ZScenaroi1: Table of Blue Artillery
Engaged based on Location of
ISIS on Territorial Map
ZScenario1: Table for Recruitable
Population based on Location of
ISIS on Territorial Map
Recruitable
Population of
Controlled
Population
BATTLE TERRAIN
AND TYPE BY
SCENARIO
SYMPATHETIC
POPULATION FOR
RECRUITING BY
SCENARIO
Situational BlueExperience
ZScenario1: Table of Blue
Experienced based on ISIS
Location on Territorial Map
ZScenario1: Table of Blue
Morale Based on ISIS Location
on Territorial Map
Blue Morale
Embed US
Advisers (Morale)
Embed US Adivsers
(Experience)
<Time>
Morale Effect
Experience Effect
Policy
Intervention Time
Strikes per Day
against Oil
<Policy
Intervention Time>
<Time>
Cummulativ
e Air Strikes
against BPD
Rate of Air Strikes
Strikes per Period
Against BPD
Targeting Switch
Targeted Strikes
per Day
Effect of Strike on
BPD
Disable Oil
ZScenario1: Table for Cumm Total
Recruitable Population based on
Location of ISIS on Map
Current Territory
Recruitable Population
Days in a Period
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Territory & Scenario Sector Equations 
(017) "% of Territory Controlled by ISIS" = "Territory ISIS Controlled (km^2)" / "Territory (km^2)"  
 Units: Percentage 
  
(033) Available Oil Production = 5.013e+008 * Disable Oil  
 Units: Barrels/Period 
 Total Syria & Iraq production pre-war and prior to ISIS inefficiences or attacks. 
 
(040) "Baseline Switch (1 = On)" = 0 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(047) Blue Artillery Engaged = "ZScenaroi1: Table of Blue Artillery Engaged based on Location of 
ISIS on Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
           )  
 Units: Pieces 
  
(055) Blue HW Engaged = "ZScenario1: Table of Blue HW Engaged based on Location of ISIS on 
Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
           )  
 Units: Pieces 
  
(061) Blue Infantry Engaged = "ZScenario1: Table of Blue Infantry Engaged based on Location of 
ISIS on Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
           )  
 Units: People 
  
(065) Blue Morale = "ZScenario1: Table of Blue Morale Based on ISIS Location on Territorial Map" 
( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map ) + Morale Effect 
            
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(070) Change in Controlled Population = ISIS Controlled Population - "Population Controlled by 
Coercive Power (People)"  
 Units: People 
  
(083) Cummulative Air Strikes against BPD = INTEG( Rate of Air Strikes , 0)  
 Units: Strikes 
  
(084) Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map = "% of Territory Controlled by ISIS"  
 Units: Percentage 
  
(085) Current Territory Recruitable Population = "ZScenario1: Table for Cumm Total Recruitable 
Population based on Location of ISIS on Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
           )  
 Units: People 
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(087) Days in a Period = 180 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(111) Disable Oil = 1 
 Units: Barrels/Period 
 Used for Proposition 2 - normal value =1, disabled value = 0 
 
(114) Effect of Attacks on Oil Production = Cummulative Air Strikes against BPD * Effect of Strike 
on BPD  
 Units: Barrels/Period 
  
(121) Effect of Strike on BPD = 400 
 Units: Barrels/(Period*Strike) 
  
(125) "Embed US Adivsers (Experience)" = 1 
 Units: Exp Years 
 0 is normal. 1 is the increase in average Exp Years due to having US troops embedded. 
 
(126) "Embed US Advisers (Morale)" = 0.25 
 Units: Dmnl 
 0 is normal. .25 is nominal additional morale factor for US troops being embedded. 
 
(136) Experience Effect = IF THEN ELSE ( Time > Policy Intervention Time , "Embed US Adivsers 
(Experience)" , 0)  
 Units: Exp Years 
  
(174) ISIS Controlled Population = ( "Baseline Switch (1 = On)" * "ZBaseline: Table for Percentage of 
Population Controlled based on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" 
           ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map ) * Total Population ) + ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = 
On)" * "ZScenario1: Table for Percentage of Population Controlled Based on Location of ISIS on 
Territorial Map" 
                ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map ) * Total Population )  
 Units: People 
  
(177) ISIS Inefficiencies = 0.5 
 Units: Fraction 
  
(180) ISIS Oil Production after Attacks = ISIS Oil Production before Attacks - Effect of Attacks on Oil 
Production  
 Units: Barrels/Period 
  
(181) ISIS Oil Production before Attacks = "Oil Production before Attacks & Inefficiencies" * ISIS 
Inefficiencies  
 Units: Barrels/Period 
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(222) Morale Effect = IF THEN ELSE ( Time > Policy Intervention Time , "Embed US Advisers 
(Morale)" , 0)  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(232) "Oil Production before Attacks & Inefficiencies" = ( "Baseline Switch (1 = On)" * "ZBaseline: 
Table for the Percentage of Oil Production based on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" 
           ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map ) * Available Oil Production ) + ( "Scenario 1 
Switch (1 = On)" * "ZScernario1: Table for the Percentage of Oil Production based on Location of ISIS 
on Territorial Map" 
                ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map ) * Available Oil Production )  
 Units: Barrels/Period 
 At least one switch must be activated on main page. 
 
(244) Policy Intervention Time = 2013.5 
 Units: Period 
  
(245) "Population (People)" = INTEG( "Births & Immigration (People/Period)" - "Deaths, Recruiting 
& Emmigration (People/Period)" , Initial Population  
           )  
 Units: People 
 Combined population of all Syrian and Iraqi Provinces. “Provinces of Syria”, Administrative 
Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last  
   modified September 22, 2004, accessed September 19th, 2014, 
http://www.statoids.com/usy.html. “Provinces of Iraq”, Administrative  
   Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last modified March 16, 2014, accessed 
September 19th, 2014, http://www.statoids.com/uiq.html. 
 
(246) "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" = INTEG( "Gain in Control 
(People/Period)" - "Loss of Control (People/Period)" , ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" 
           * "ZScenario1: Starting Population Controlled" ) )  
 Units: People 
  
(257) Rate of Air Strikes = IF THEN ELSE ( Time > Policy Intervention Time , Strikes per Period 
Against BPD , 0)  
 Units: Strikes/Period 
  
(274) Recruitable Population of Controlled Population = "ZScenario1: Table for Recruitable 
Population based on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" (  
           Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map )  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(296) "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" = 1 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(330) Situational Blue Experience = "ZScenario1: Table of Blue Experienced based on ISIS Location 
on Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
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           ) + Experience Effect  
 Units: Exp Years 
  
(335) Strategic Surprise Factor = "ZScenario1: Table for Strategic Surprise Based on Location of ISIS 
on Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
           )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(336) Strikes per Day against Oil = 0 
 Units: Strikes/Period 
 Normal value is 0. Minimal is 5, Significant is 50, intensive is 250. 
 
(337) Strikes per Period Against BPD = Targeted Strikes per Day * Days in a Period  
 Units: Strikes/Period 
  
(367) Targeted Strikes per Day = Strikes per Day against Oil * Targeting Switch  
 Units: Strikes/Period 
  
(368) Targeting Switch = IF THEN ELSE ( Cummulative Air Strikes against BPD > ( ISIS Oil 
Production before Attacks / Effect of Strike on BPD ) , 0, 1)  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(371) "Territory (km^2)" = 619308 
 Units: "km^2" 
 Includes all Provinces and Governates of Iraq and Syria. “Provinces of Syria”, Administrative 
Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last  
   modified September 22, 2004, accessed September 19th, 2014, 
http://www.statoids.com/usy.html. “Provinces of Iraq”, Administrative  
   Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last modified March 16, 2014, accessed 
September 19th, 2014, http://www.statoids.com/uiq.html. 
 
(372) "Territory ISIS Controlled (km^2)" = INTEG( "Rate of Territory Gained (km^2/period)" - "Rate 
of Territory Lost (km^2/Period)" , ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" 
           * "ZScenario1: Starting Territory" ) )  
 Units: "km^2" 
  
(389) Total Population = "Population (People)"  
 Units: People 
  
(391) Type of Battle = ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" * "ZScernario1: Table for Battle Type based on 
Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
                ) )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(392) Type of Terrain = ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" * "ZScernario1: Table for the Terrain Type 
Vased on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
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                ) )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(397) "ZBaseline: Table for Percentage of Population Controlled based on Location of ISIS on 
Territorial Map" ( [(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(1,1) ) 
 Units: Percentage 
  
(398) "ZBaseline: Table for the Percentage of Oil Production based on Location of ISIS on Territorial 
Map" ( [(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(1,1) ) 
 Units: Percentage 
 Need Values for Total BPD Potential Production 
 
(404) "ZScenario1: Table for Cumm Total Recruitable Population based on Location of ISIS on Map" 
( [(0,0)-(1,400000)],(0.00317,50662),(0.00322,125750) 
            ,(0.0566,356842),(0.08828,487942),(0.08844,599080),(0.08866,1.01308e+006),(0.31224,1.0820
8e+006),(0.3725,1.18374e+006),(0.41247,1.33232e+006) 
            ,(0.41263,1.39212e+006),(0.41885,1.40175e+006),(0.45652,1.4655e+006),(0.45657,1.468e+006
),(0.48642,1.858e+006),(0.48672,2.17782e+006),(0.50235,2.23182e+006) 
            ,(0.50251,2.3169e+006),(0.51686,2.5611e+006),(0.51702,2.67367e+006),(0.5852,2.83867e+006
),(0.61432,2.94867e+006),(0.61465,3.30947e+006),(0.61482,3.39502e+006) 
            ) 
 Units: People 
  
(405) "ZScenario1: Table for Percentage of Population Controlled Based on Location of ISIS on 
Territorial Map" ( [(0,0)-(1,1)],(0.00317,0.006),(0.00322,0.014) 
            ,(0.0566,0.039),(0.08828,0.053),(0.08844,0.065),(0.08866,0.11),(0.31224,0.118),(0.3725,0.129),
(0.41247,0.145),(0.41263,0.151),(0.41885,0.156) 
            ,(0.45652,0.188),(0.45657,0.189),(0.48642,0.254),(0.48672,0.308),(0.50235,0.321),(0.50251,0.3
43),(0.51686,0.383),(0.51702,0.402),(0.5852,0.43) 
            ,(0.61432,0.457),(0.61465,0.638),(0.61482,0.681) ) 
 Units: Percentage 
  
(406) "ZScenario1: Table for Recruitable Population based on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" 
( [(0,0)-(1,400000)],(0.00317,50662),(0.00322,75088) 
            ,(0.0566,231092),(0.08828,131100),(0.08844,111138),(0.08866,414000),(0.31224,69000),(0.372
5,101660),(0.41247,148580),(0.41263,59800),(0.41885,9626) 
            ,(0.45652,63756),(0.45657,2500),(0.48642,390000),(0.48672,319815),(0.50235,54000),(0.50251
,85079),(0.51686,244200),(0.51702,112575),(0.5852,165000) 
            ,(0.61432,110000),(0.61465,360800),(0.61482,85550) ) 
 Units: People/(Period*Percentage) 
  
(407) "ZScenario1: Table for Strategic Surprise Based on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" ( [(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0.00317,0.05),(0.00322,0.05),(0.0566,0.25) 
            ,(0.08828,0.25),(0.08844,0.5),(0.08866,0.5),(0.31224,1),(0.41247,1),(0.41263,1),(0.41885,1),(0.4
5652,1),(0.45657,1),(0.48642,1),(0.48672,1) 
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            ,(0.50235,1),(0.50251,1),(0.51686,1),(0.51702,1),(0.5852,1),(0.61432,1),(0.61465,1),(0.61482,1)
,(1,1) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(408) "ZScenario1: Table of Blue Experienced based on ISIS Location on Territorial Map" ( [(0,0)-
(1,5)],(0.00317,0.25),(0.00322,0.25),(0.0566,0.25),(0.08828,0.25) 
            ,(0.08844,0.25),(0.08866,0.25),(0.31224,0.25),(0.3725,0.25),(0.41247,0.25),(0.41263,5),(0.4188
5,5),(0.45652,5),(0.45657,3),(0.48642,3),(0.48672,3) 
            ,(0.50235,5),(0.50251,5),(0.51686,3),(0.51702,3),(0.5852,3),(0.61432,3),(0.61465,3),(0.61482,3)
 ) 
 Units: Exp Years 
  
(409) "ZScenario1: Table of Blue HW Engaged based on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" ( [(0,0)-
(1,5000)],(0.00317,80),(0.00322,119),(0.0566,365),(0.08828,207) 
            ,(0.08844,176),(0.08866,654),(0.31224,109),(0.3725,161),(0.41247,235),(0.41263,95),(0.41885,
70),(0.45652,28),(0.45657,454),(0.48642,436),(0.48672,1218) 
            ,(0.50235,51),(0.50251,455),(0.51686,301),(0.51702,126),(0.5852,799),(0.61432,400),(0.61465,
4796),(0.61482,3197) ) 
 Units: Pieces/Percentage 
  
(410) "ZScenario1: Table of Blue Infantry Engaged based on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" 
( [(0,0)-(1,600000)],(0.00317,8531),(0.00322,12645),(0.0566,38916) 
            ,(0.08828,22077),(0.08844,18716),(0.08866,69717),(0.31224,11620),(0.3725,17120),(0.41247,2
5021),(0.41263,10070),(0.41885,7456),(0.45652,2941) 
            ,(0.45657,48375),(0.48642,46440),(0.48672,129753),(0.50235,5433),(0.50251,48437),(0.51686,
32090),(0.51702,13468),(0.5852,85140),(0.61432,42605) 
            ,(0.61465,510840),(0.61482,340560) ) 
 Units: People/Percentage 
  
(411) "ZScenario1: Table of Blue Morale Based on ISIS Location on Territorial Map" ( [(0,-0.3)-
(1,0.15)],(0.00317,-0.25),(0.00322,-0.25),(0.0566,-0.25) 
            ,(0.08828,-0.25),(0.08844,-0.25),(0.08866,-0.25),(0.31224,-0.25),(0.3725,-
0.25),(0.41247,0),(0.41263,0),(0.41885,0),(0.45652,0.125),(0.45657,0.125) 
            ,(0.48642,0.125),(0.48672,0.05),(0.50235,0.05),(0.50251,0.05),(0.51686,0),(0.51702,0),(0.5852,
0),(0.61432,0),(0.61465,0.125),(0.61482,0.125) 
            ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(412) "ZScenaroi1: Table of Blue Artillery Engaged based on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" 
( [(0,0)-(1,1600)],(0.00317,26),(0.00322,39),(0.0566,121) 
            ,(0.08828,68),(0.08844,58),(0.08866,216),(0.31224,36),(0.3725,53),(0.41247,78),(0.41263,31),(0
.41885,23),(0.45652,9),(0.45657,150),(0.48642,144) 
            ,(0.48672,403),(0.50235,17),(0.50251,150),(0.51686,100),(0.51702,42),(0.5852,264),(0.61432,1
32),(0.61465,1585),(0.61482,1057) ) 
 Units: Pieces/Percentage 
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(413) "ZScernario1: Table for Battle Type based on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" ( [(0,0)-
(0.7,6)],(0.00317,1),(0.00322,1),(0.0566,3),(0.08828,3) 
            ,(0.08844,4),(0.08866,2),(0.31224,1),(0.3725,1),(0.41247,1),(0.41263,3),(0.41885,1),(0.45652,6)
,(0.45657,5),(0.48642,6),(0.48672,5),(0.50235,6) 
            ,(0.50251,5),(0.51686,1),(0.51702,6),(0.5852,5),(0.61432,2),(0.61465,5),(0.61482,5) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scenario 1 
 
(414) "ZScernario1: Table for the Percentage of Oil Production based on Location of ISIS on 
Territorial Map" ( [(0,0)-(1,0.2)],(0,0),(0.039,0.01307),(0.343,0.0382) 
            ,(0.46467,0.11783),(1,0.11783) ) 
 Units: Percentage 
 Scenario 1 
 
(415) "ZScernario1: Table for the Terrain Type Vased on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" ( [(0,0)-
(0.7,5)],(0.00317,4),(0.00322,4),(0.0566,1),(0.08828,1) 
            ,(0.08844,4),(0.08866,4),(0.31224,1),(0.3725,1),(0.41247,1),(0.41263,4),(0.41885,2),(0.45652,5)
,(0.45657,4),(0.48642,1),(0.48672,4),(0.50235,1) 
            ,(0.50251,4),(0.51686,1),(0.51702,2),(0.5852,4),(0.61432,2),(0.61465,4),(0.61482,4) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scenario 1 
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Combat Simulator (Situational Force Scoring) Sector Structure 
RED Team
(ISIS)
BLUE Team (ISIS
Opponents)
Red Heavy Weapons (Armor,
Artillery & Heavy Mount
Technicals)
Red Infantry (Infantry &
Light Mount Technicals)
Red Indirect Attacks
(Mortars, IED, VBIED &
SvIED)
Table for Effect of Terrain
Type on Max Density Heavy
Weapons
Table for Effect of Terrain Type
on Max Density Infantry &
Indirect Attacks
Terrain limiters are ignored on
indirect attack because of
inclusion of IED
<Heavy Weapons
(Pieces)>
<All Other
Attacks>
<Normal Size of
Squad>
<Indirect Attacks
(Attacks/Period)>
19 Fractional Loss
(row 18 / row 14)
20 Assets Lost by
Category
SFS Avg. Red Heavy
Weapon WEI/WUV
SFS Red Heavy
Weapons Raw Strength
SFS Avg Red Inf
WEI/WUV
SFS Avg Red
Indirec Attack
WEI/WUV
SFS Red Infanry
Raw Strength
SFS Red Indirec
Attack Raw Strength
Assets per Piece Assets per Squad
Military Actions
per Indirect Attack
<ISIS Combat
Multiplier>
SFS Red Heavy
Weapon Base Strength
SFS Red Infantry
Base Strength
SFS Red Indirect
Attack Base Strength
Assets per Person
Military Actions
per Squad Assets per Indirect
Attack
Table for Effect of Type of
Battle on Heavy Weapons
ATTACKER
Table for Effect of Type of
Battle on Infantry
ATTACKER
Table for Effect of Type of
Battle on Indirect Attacks
ATTACKER
Table for Effect of Type of
Battle on Heavy Weapons
DEFENDER
Table for Effect of Type of
Battle on Infantry
DEFENDER
Table for Effect of Type of
Battle on Indirect Attack
DEFENDER
<Type of Battle>
SFS Red Heavy
Weapons Situational
Strength
SFS Red Infantry
Situational Strength
SFS Red Indirect
Attack Situational
Strength
Red Force
Strength
Blue Heavy
Weapons (Armor)
Blue Infantry (Infantry &
Light Mount Technicals)
Blue Indirect Attacks
(True Artillery)
<All Other
Attacks>
SFS Avg. Blue Heavy
Weapon WEI/WUV
SFS Blue Heavy
Weapons Raw Strength
SFS Avg Blue Inf
WEI/WUV
SFS Avg Blue Indirect
Attack WEI/WUV
SFS Blue Infantry
Raw Strength
SFS Blue Indirect
Attack Raw Strength
SFS Blue Heavy
Weapon Base Strength
SFS Blue Infantry
Base Strength
SFS Blue Indirect
Attack Base Strength
<Type of Battle>
SFS Blue Heavy
Weapons Situational
Strength
SFS Blue Infantry
Situational Strength
SFS Blue Indirect Attack
Situational Strength
Blue Force
Strength
<Assets per
Piece>
<Military Actions
per Squad>
<Assets per
Person>
SFS Modified
Force Ratio
Blue Side does not use
suicide bombers
SFS Defender Loss
Rate
SFS Exchange Rate
High Intensity Defender
Loss Ratio Multiplier
High Intensity
Exchange Rate
Multiplier
High Intensity FLOT
Movement Rate (FMR)
Multiplier
Intensity
FLOT Movement
Rate (FMR)
Battle Intensity
Table for Effect of Battle
Type on Battle Intensity
<Type of Battle>
Table for the Effect of
Battle Type on FMR1
<Type of Battle>
SFS Attacker
Loss Rate
(ALR)
FLOT Does not
incorporate TacAir
FMR Base1
FMR Base2
Table for Effect of
Battle Type on FMR2
SFS Blue Losses
SFS Red Losses <Blue Force
Strength>
<Red Force
Strength>
SFS Fraction of
Blue Losses
SFS Fraction of
Red Losses
Simplified without combined arms
either on multiplier or loss assignments.
Losses are straight percentage through.
<Heavy Weapons
(Pieces)>
<ISIS Militants
(People)>
Red HW Initial
Losses Red Infantry Initial
Losses
HW
Recovery
Red HW Final
Losses Red Infantry Final
Losses
Density Modifier for
Infantry & Red Indirect
Attacks
<Type of Terrain>
Density Modifier for
Blue Indirect Attacks
Density Modifier for
Heavy Weapons
Table for Effect of Terrain
Type on Max Density of
Indirect Attacks
<Density Modifier for
Heavy Weapons>
<Density Modifier for
Infantry & Red Indirect
Attacks>
<Density Modifier for
Heavy Weapons>
<Density Modifier for
Infantry & Red Indirect
Attacks>
<Density Modifier for
Blue Indirect Attacks>
Table for Effect of
Preparation of Attacker on
Intensity Mult
Table for Effect of
Preparation of Attacker on
ER Adjustment
Days Prep
Between Battles
Minimum Days
Between Battles
Maximum Days
between Battles
Mean Days
Between BattlesNOISE SEED
Standard Deviation
between Battles
Effect of Preparation of
Attacker on Intensity Mult
Effect of Preparation
on ER Adjustment
Red Indirect Attack
Multiplier based on Days
Prep
<Red Indirect Attack
Multiplier based on Days
Prep>
Days since
Last
Engagement
Increase in Days
Since Last Battle
Time Passing
Reduction in Days
since Last
Engagement
Battle Decision
Number of
Battles
FoughtEngagements
Conducted
Portion of Period
spent Fighting Battle
<Blue Combat
Multiplier>
Blue HW Initial
Losses
Blue Infantry Initial
Losses
Blue HW Final
Losses Blue Infantry Final
Losses
Blue Artillery Initial
Losses
Blue Artillery Final
Losses
<HWRecovery>
Add in FLOT
movement recovery
Heavy Weapons
Looted
Scavenging Rate of
Heavy Weapons
<Blue HW
Engaged> <Blue Infantry
Engaged>
<Blue Artillery
Engaged>
<Blue HW
Engaged>
<Blue Infantry
Engaged> <Blue Artillery
Engaged>
DLR '/ALR'
<Portion of Period
spent Fighting
Battle>
<Strategic Surprise
Factor>
Table for Effect of Battle
Type on FMR2 (ISIS
Variant)
DOUBLE CHECK
DERIVATIVES WITH ALL
NOTATIONS OF '
Assets per
Artillery
Decision to Fight
Battle
Length of Battle
Infantry Recovery
(People/Period)
Battles per
Decision
Time to Recognize
BattleDays
Supply Better US
Equipment
US Airpower
Support Step Height
Ground Support
Campaign Start
<Time>
<Time>
USEquipmentModifier
<Policy
Intervention Time>
<Policy
Intervention Time>
<Targeting
Switch>
Disable FLOT
<LocalOpposition Fighters(People)>
<Blue Infantry
Engaged>
<Local Opposition
Fighters (People)>% of Blue Infantry that are
Local Opposition Fighters
<Blue Infantry Final
Losses>
Opposition Fighter
Losses
Movement
Direction
<Blue Force
Fighters>
Blue Infantry
Actual Losses
Time to Repair &
Operate
Blue Infantry
Recovery
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Combat Simulator (Situational Force Scoring) Sector Equations 
 
(004) TIME STEP = 0.0055 
 Units: Period [0,?] 
 The time step for the simulation. 
 
(011) "% of Blue Infantry that are Local Opposition Fighters" = "Local Opposition Fighters (People)" / 
( Blue Infantry Engaged + "Local Opposition Fighters (People)" 
                )  
 Units: Percentage 
  
(027) All Other Attacks = Actual Military Actions - "Ethnic Cleansing Actions (Military 
Actions/Period)" - "Indirect Attacks (Attacks/Period)"  
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(028) Assets per Artillery = 1 
 Units: Assets/Pieces 
  
(029) Assets per Indirect Attack = 1 
 Units: Assets 
  
(030) Assets per Person = 1 
 Units: Assets/Person 
  
(031) Assets per Piece = 1 
 Units: Assets/Pieces 
  
(032) Assets per Squad = Assets per Person * Normal Size of Squad  
 Units: Assets/Squad 
  
(041) Battle Decision = ( IF THEN ELSE ( Days since Last Engagement > Days Prep Between Battles , 
1, 0) )  
 Units: Days 
  
(042) Battle Intensity = Table for Effect of Battle Type on Battle Intensity ( Type of Battle )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(043) Battles per Decision = 1 
 Units: Battle/Day 
  
(047) Blue Artillery Engaged = "ZScenaroi1: Table of Blue Artillery Engaged based on Location of 
ISIS on Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
           )  
 Units: Pieces 
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(048) Blue Artillery Final Losses = ( Blue Artillery Initial Losses - ( Blue Artillery Initial Losses * HW 
Recovery ) )  
 Units: Pieces 
  
(049) Blue Artillery Initial Losses = Blue Artillery Engaged * SFS Fraction of Blue Losses  
 Units: Pieces 
  
(050) Blue Combat Multiplier = 1 + ( Blue Morale Multiplier + Blue Combat Multiplier from 
Experience )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(052) Blue Force Fighters = INTEG( Increase in Blue Force Fighters - Rate of Blue Force Deaths , 
Starting Blue Force Fighters Actively Opopsing ISIS )  
 Units: People 
  
(053) Blue Force Strength = ( SFS Blue Heavy Weapons Situational Strength + SFS Blue Indirect 
Attack Situational Strength + SFS Blue Infantry Situational Strength 
           ) + ( ( SFS Blue Heavy Weapons Situational Strength + SFS Blue Indirect Attack Situational 
Strength + SFS Blue Infantry Situational Strength 
                ) * Ground Support Campaign Start )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(054) "Blue Heavy Weapons (Armor)" = Blue HW Engaged * Assets per Piece * Density Modifier for 
Heavy Weapons  
 Units: Assets 
  
(055) Blue HW Engaged = "ZScenario1: Table of Blue HW Engaged based on Location of ISIS on 
Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
           )  
 Units: Pieces 
  
(056) Blue HW Final Losses = ( Blue HW Initial Losses - ( Blue HW Initial Losses * HW Recovery ) )  
 Units: Pieces 
  
(057) Blue HW Initial Losses = Blue HW Engaged * SFS Fraction of Blue Losses  
 Units: Pieces 
  
(058) "Blue Indirect Attacks (True Artillery)" = ( Blue Artillery Engaged ) * Assets per Artillery * 
Density Modifier for Blue Indirect Attacks  
 Units: Assets 
  
(059) "Blue Infantry (Infantry & Light Mount Technicals)" = ( Blue Infantry Engaged + "Local 
Opposition Fighters (People)" ) * Assets per Person * "Density Modifier for Infantry & Red Indirect 
Attacks" 
            
 Units: Assets 
© Tim Clancy MAR 2015                               Contact: timothy.clancy.nv@gmail.com 115
  
(060) Blue Infantry Actual Losses = Blue Infantry Final Losses - Opposition Fighter Losses  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(061) Blue Infantry Engaged = "ZScenario1: Table of Blue Infantry Engaged based on Location of 
ISIS on Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
           )  
 Units: People 
  
(062) Blue Infantry Final Losses = Blue Infantry Initial Losses * Blue Infantry Recovery  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(063) Blue Infantry Initial Losses = Blue Infantry Engaged * SFS Fraction of Blue Losses  
 Units: People 
  
(064) Blue Infantry Recovery = 0.25 
 Units: Fraction/Period 
  
(086) Days = 1 
 Units: Days 
  
(088) Days Prep Between Battles = RANDOM NORMAL ( Minimum Days Between Battles , 
Maximum Days between Battles , Mean Days Between Battles , Standard Deviation between Battles 
           , NOISE SEED )  
 Units: Days 
  
(089) Days since Last Engagement = INTEG( Increase in Days Since Last Battle - Reduction in Days 
since Last Engagement , 5)  
 Units: Days 
  
(095) Decision to Fight Battle = 1 
 Units: Days 
  
(098) Density Modifier for Blue Indirect Attacks = Table for Effect of Terrain Type on Max Density of 
Indirect Attacks ( Type of Terrain )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(099) Density Modifier for Heavy Weapons = Table for Effect of Terrain Type on Max Density Heavy 
Weapons ( Type of Terrain )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(100) "Density Modifier for Infantry & Red Indirect Attacks" = "Table for Effect of Terrain Type on 
Max Density Infantry & Indirect Attacks" ( Type of Terrain 
           )  
 Units: Dmnl 
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(108) Disable FLOT = 1 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Used to test Proposition 1. Normal value =1 , disabled value = 0. 
 
(112) "DLR '/ALR'" = ZIDZ ( SFS Defender Loss Rate , "SFS Attacker Loss Rate (ALR)" )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(116) Effect of Preparation of Attacker on Intensity Mult = Table for Effect of Preparation of Attacker 
on Intensity Mult ( Days Prep Between Battles  
           )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(117) Effect of Preparation on ER Adjustment = Table for Effect of Preparation of Attacker on ER 
Adjustment ( Days Prep Between Battles )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(127) Engagements Conducted = ( Battle Decision * Battles per Decision ) / Portion of Period spent 
Fighting Battle  
 Units: Battles/Period 
  
(139) "FLOT Movement Rate (FMR)" = ( ( ( FMR Base1 + FMR Base2 ) * "High Intensity FLOT 
Movement Rate (FMR) Multiplier" ) * Disable FLOT ) * Movement Direction 
            
 Units: "km^2" 
  
(140) FMR Base1 = Table for the Effect of Battle Type on FMR1 ( Type of Battle ) * ZIDZ ( SFS 
Defender Loss Rate , "SFS Attacker Loss Rate (ALR)" )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(141) FMR Base2 = "Table for Effect of Battle Type on FMR2 (ISIS Variant)" ( Type of Battle )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(148) Ground Support Campaign Start = IF THEN ELSE ( Targeting Switch = 0, US Airpower 
Support Step Height , 0)  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(150) "Heavy Weapons (Pieces)" = INTEG( "Heavy Weapon Additions (Pieces per Period)" - "Heavy 
Weapon Losses (Pieces per Period)" , 0)  
 Units: Pieces 
  
(151) Heavy Weapons Looted = ( ( Blue HW Initial Losses * Scavenging Rate of Heavy Weapons ) + 
( Blue Artillery Initial Losses * Scavenging Rate of Heavy Weapons 
                ) ) / "Time to Repair & Operate"  
 Units: Pieces/Period 
  
(152) High Intensity Defender Loss Ratio Multiplier = 1.5 
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 Units: Dmnl 
  
(153) High Intensity Exchange Rate Multiplier = 1 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(154) "High Intensity FLOT Movement Rate (FMR) Multiplier" = 1.5 
 Units: "km^2" 
  
(155) HW Recovery = 0.1 
 Units: Fraction 
 Placeholder rate at which initial losses are recovered after the battle. 
 
(163) Increase in Days Since Last Battle = Time Passing  
 Units: Days/Period 
  
(167) "Indirect Attacks (Attacks/Period)" = Actual Military Actions * "% of Actions that are Indirect: 
IED, VBIED or SVIED"  
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(168) "Infantry Recovery (People/Period)" = 0.25 
 Units: Fraction 
  
(172) Intensity = High Intensity Defender Loss Ratio Multiplier * Battle Intensity  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(173) ISIS Combat Multiplier = 1 + ( Combat Multiplier from Experience + ISIS Morale Multiplier )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(178) "ISIS Militants (People)" = INTEG( "Additions (People per Period)" - "Lossess (People per 
Period)" , ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" * ZScenario1 Starting Militants 
                ) )  
 Units: People 
 Scenario Determines starting value. 
 
(186) Length of Battle = 0.0055 
 Units: Period 
  
(188) "Local Opposition Fighters (People)" = INTEG( Rate of Local Opposition Fighters Joining 
Uprising - Rate of Local Fighter Deaths , 0)  
 Units: People 
  
(212) Maximum Days between Battles = 20 
 Units: Days 
  
(213) Mean Days Between Battles = 6 
 Units: Days 
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(216) Military Actions per Indirect Attack = 1 
 Units: Military Actions/Period 
  
(217) Military Actions per Squad = 1 
 Units: Military Actions/(Period*Squad) 
  
(221) Minimum Days Between Battles = 0.5 
 Units: Days 
  
(223) Movement Direction = IF THEN ELSE ( SFS Defender Loss Rate - "SFS Attacker Loss Rate 
(ALR)" >= 0, 1, -1)  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(224) NOISE SEED = 0 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Set to 0 noise seed. Can be varied. 
 
(229) Normal Size of Squad = 11 
 Units: People/Squad 
  
(231) Number of Battles Fought = INTEG( Engagements Conducted , 0)  
 Units: Battles 
  
(233) Opposition Fighter Losses = Blue Infantry Final Losses * "% of Blue Infantry that are Local 
Opposition Fighters"  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(244) Policy Intervention Time = 2013.5 
 Units: Period 
  
(252) Portion of Period spent Fighting Battle = 0.0055 
 Units: Period 
  
(276) Red Force Strength = ( SFS Red Heavy Weapons Situational Strength + SFS Red Indirect Attack 
Situational Strength + SFS Red Infantry Situational Strength 
           )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(277) "Red Heavy Weapons (Armor, Artillery & Heavy Mount Technicals)" = "Heavy Weapons 
(Pieces)" * Assets per Piece * Density Modifier for Heavy Weapons 
            
 Units: Assets 
  
(278) Red HW Final Losses = ( Red HW Initial Losses - ( Red HW Initial Losses * HW Recovery ) )  
 Units: Pieces 
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(279) Red HW Initial Losses = MIN ( "Heavy Weapons (Pieces)" , "Heavy Weapons (Pieces)" * SFS 
Fraction of Red Losses )  
 Units: Pieces 
 Added minimum function 
 
(280) Red Indirect Attack Multiplier based on Days Prep = IF THEN ELSE ( Days Prep Between 
Battles > 10, 1.1, 0.9 + ( 0.02 * Days Prep Between Battles 
                     / Days ) )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(281) "Red Indirect Attacks (Mortars, IED, VBIED & SvIED)" = ( "Indirect Attacks (Attacks/Period)" 
/ Military Actions per Indirect Attack ) * Assets per Indirect Attack 
           * "Density Modifier for Infantry & Red Indirect Attacks"  
 Units: Assets 
  
(282) "Red Infantry (Infantry & Light Mount Technicals)" = ( All Other Attacks / Military Actions per 
Squad ) * Assets per Squad * "Density Modifier for Infantry & Red Indirect Attacks" 
            
 Units: Assets 
  
(283) Red Infantry Final Losses = ( Red Infantry Initial Losses - ( Red Infantry Initial Losses * 
"Infantry Recovery (People/Period)" ) )  
 Units: People 
  
(284) Red Infantry Initial Losses = MIN ( "ISIS Militants (People)" , "ISIS Militants (People)" * SFS 
Fraction of Red Losses )  
 Units: People 
 Added minimum function 
 
(286) Reduction in Days since Last Engagement = IF THEN ELSE ( Battle Decision = 1, Days since 
Last Engagement / Time to Recognize Battle , 0)  
 Units: Days/Period 
  
(295) Scavenging Rate of Heavy Weapons = 0.1 
 Units: Percentage 
  
(297) "SFS Attacker Loss Rate (ALR)" = IF THEN ELSE ( SFS Modified Force Ratio > 0, ( SFS 
Defender Loss Rate * SFS Exchange Rate ) / SFS Modified Force Ratio 
                , 0)  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(298) "SFS Avg Blue Indirect Attack WEI/WUV" = 1 + Supply Better US Equipment  
 Units: Dmnl/Assets 
  
(299) "SFS Avg Blue Inf WEI/WUV" = 1 + Supply Better US Equipment  
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 Units: Dmnl/Assets 
  
(300) "SFS Avg Red Indirec Attack WEI/WUV" = 1 
 Units: Dmnl/Assets 
  
(301) "SFS Avg Red Inf WEI/WUV" = 1 
 Units: Dmnl/Assets 
  
(302) "SFS Avg. Blue Heavy Weapon WEI/WUV" = 1 + Supply Better US Equipment  
 Units: Dmnl/Assets 
  
(303) "SFS Avg. Red Heavy Weapon WEI/WUV" = 1 + Supply Better US Equipment  
 Units: Dmnl/Assets 
  
(304) SFS Blue Heavy Weapon Base Strength = SFS Blue Heavy Weapons Raw Strength * Blue 
Combat Multiplier  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(305) SFS Blue Heavy Weapons Raw Strength = "SFS Avg. Blue Heavy Weapon WEI/WUV" * "Blue 
Heavy Weapons (Armor)"  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(306) SFS Blue Heavy Weapons Situational Strength = Table for Effect of Type of Battle on Heavy 
Weapons DEFENDER ( Type of Battle ) * SFS Blue Heavy Weapon Base Strength 
            
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(307) SFS Blue Indirect Attack Base Strength = ISIS Combat Multiplier * SFS Blue Indirect Attack 
Raw Strength * Blue Combat Multiplier  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(308) SFS Blue Indirect Attack Raw Strength = "SFS Avg Blue Indirect Attack WEI/WUV" * "Blue 
Indirect Attacks (True Artillery)"  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(309) SFS Blue Indirect Attack Situational Strength = Table for Effect of Type of Battle on Indirect 
Attack DEFENDER ( Type of Battle ) * SFS Blue Indirect Attack Base Strength 
            
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(310) SFS Blue Infantry Base Strength = SFS Blue Infantry Raw Strength * Blue Combat Multiplier  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(311) SFS Blue Infantry Raw Strength = "Blue Infantry (Infantry & Light Mount Technicals)" * "SFS 
Avg Blue Inf WEI/WUV"  
 Units: Dmnl 
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(312) SFS Blue Infantry Situational Strength = Table for Effect of Type of Battle on Infantry 
DEFENDER ( Type of Battle ) * SFS Blue Infantry Base Strength 
            
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(313) SFS Blue Losses = Blue Force Strength * SFS Defender Loss Rate  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(314) SFS Defender Loss Rate = IF THEN ELSE ( SFS Modified Force Ratio > 0, Intensity * ( 0.03 * 
SFS Modified Force Ratio ^ 0.64) , 0)  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(315) SFS Exchange Rate = MIN ( 5, IF THEN ELSE ( SFS Modified Force Ratio > 0, High Intensity 
Exchange Rate Multiplier * ( 4.5 * ( SFS Modified Force Ratio 
                          ^ ( -0.57) ) ) , 0) )  
 Units: Dmnl 
 Added minimum function for now to capp exchange rate losses. MIN(5,IF THEN ELSE(SFS 
Modified Force Ratio>0,High Intensity Exchange Rate  
   Multiplier*(4.5*(SFS Modified Force Ratio^(-0.57)) ),0)) 
 
(316) SFS Fraction of Blue Losses = ZIDZ ( SFS Blue Losses , Blue Force Strength )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(317) SFS Fraction of Red Losses = ZIDZ ( SFS Red Losses , Red Force Strength )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(318) SFS Modified Force Ratio = ZIDZ ( Red Force Strength , ( Strategic Surprise Factor * Blue 
Force Strength ) )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(319) SFS Red Heavy Weapon Base Strength = SFS Red Heavy Weapons Raw Strength * ISIS 
Combat Multiplier  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(320) SFS Red Heavy Weapons Raw Strength = "SFS Avg. Red Heavy Weapon WEI/WUV" * "Red 
Heavy Weapons (Armor, Artillery & Heavy Mount Technicals)"  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(321) SFS Red Heavy Weapons Situational Strength = Table for Effect of Type of Battle on Heavy 
Weapons ATTACKER ( Type of Battle ) * SFS Red Heavy Weapon Base Strength 
            
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(322) SFS Red Indirec Attack Raw Strength = "SFS Avg Red Indirec Attack WEI/WUV" * "Red 
Indirect Attacks (Mortars, IED, VBIED & SvIED)"  
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 Units: Dmnl 
  
(323) SFS Red Indirect Attack Base Strength = ( ISIS Combat Multiplier * SFS Red Indirec Attack 
Raw Strength ) * Red Indirect Attack Multiplier based on Days Prep 
            
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(324) SFS Red Indirect Attack Situational Strength = Table for Effect of Type of Battle on Indirect 
Attacks ATTACKER ( Type of Battle ) * SFS Red Indirect Attack Base Strength 
            
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(325) SFS Red Infanry Raw Strength = "Red Infantry (Infantry & Light Mount Technicals)" * "SFS 
Avg Red Inf WEI/WUV"  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(326) SFS Red Infantry Base Strength = SFS Red Infanry Raw Strength * ISIS Combat Multiplier  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(327) SFS Red Infantry Situational Strength = Table for Effect of Type of Battle on Infantry 
ATTACKER ( Type of Battle ) * SFS Red Infantry Base Strength 
            
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(328) SFS Red Losses = SFS Blue Losses * SFS Exchange Rate  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(332) Standard Deviation between Battles = 1 
 Units: Days 
  
(335) Strategic Surprise Factor = "ZScenario1: Table for Strategic Surprise Based on Location of ISIS 
on Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
           )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(341) Supply Better US Equipment = IF THEN ELSE ( Time > Policy Intervention Time , 
USEquipmentModifier , 0)  
 Units: Dmnl/Assets 
 0 is normal value. .25 indicates a 25% increase in Weapon Value/Weapon Effectiveness by 
supplying US Arms. Note, the incease in Weapon  
   Value/Weapon Effectiveness translates over to ISIS HW as well. 
 
(344) Table for Effect of Battle Type on Battle Intensity ( [(0,0)-
(7,1.2)],(1,1.05),(2,1.05),(3,1),(4,0.95),(5,0.8),(6,0.85) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
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(345) Table for Effect of Battle Type on FMR2 ( [(0,-0.5)-(7,30)],(1,30),(2,0),(3,0),(4,0),(5,-0.5),(6,0) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(346) "Table for Effect of Battle Type on FMR2 (ISIS Variant)" ( [(0,-300)-
(7,1250)],(1,1000),(2,25),(3,25),(4,25),(5,10),(6,500) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(350) Table for Effect of Preparation of Attacker on ER Adjustment ( [(0,0)-
(20,1.25)],(0,1.15),(1,1.1),(3,1.05),(5,1),(7,0.95),(20,0.95) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(351) Table for Effect of Preparation of Attacker on Intensity Mult ( [(0,0)-
(20,1.25)],(0,0.65),(1,0.75),(3,0.85),(5,0.95),(7,1),(20,1) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(355) Table for Effect of Terrain Type on Max Density Heavy Weapons ( [(0,0)-
(5,1.5)],(1,0.8),(2,1),(3,0.5),(4,0.4),(5,0.2) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(356) "Table for Effect of Terrain Type on Max Density Infantry & Indirect Attacks" ( [(0,0)-
(10,10)],(1,0.8),(2,1),(3,0.8),(4,1.2),(5,0.6) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(357) Table for Effect of Terrain Type on Max Density of Indirect Attacks ( [(0,0)-
(6,1.1)],(1,1),(2,1),(3,0.8),(4,0.7),(5,0.4) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(359) Table for Effect of Type of Battle on Heavy Weapons ATTACKER ( [(0,0)-
(6,1.5)],(1,1.4),(2,1.2),(3,1),(4,0.95),(5,0.9),(6,0.8) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(360) Table for Effect of Type of Battle on Heavy Weapons DEFENDER ( [(0,0)-
(6,1.3)],(1,0.8),(2,0.8),(3,1),(4,1.1),(5,1.2),(6,0.8) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(361) Table for Effect of Type of Battle on Indirect Attack DEFENDER ( [(0,0)-
(6,1.5)],(1,0.5),(2,0.8),(3,1),(4,1.1),(5,1.2),(6,0.5) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(362) Table for Effect of Type of Battle on Indirect Attacks ATTACKER ( [(0,0)-
(6,1.3)],(1,0.4),(2,1.2),(3,1),(4,0.95),(5,0.9),(6,0.8) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(363) Table for Effect of Type of Battle on Infantry ATTACKER ( [(0,0)-
(6,1.3)],(1,0.4),(2,1.2),(3,1),(4,0.95),(5,0.95),(6,1) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
© Tim Clancy MAR 2015                               Contact: timothy.clancy.nv@gmail.com 124
  
(364) Table for Effect of Type of Battle on Infantry ATTACKER 0 ( [(0,0)-
(6,1.3)],(1,0.4),(2,1.2),(3,1),(4,0.95),(5,0.95),(6,1) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(365) Table for Effect of Type of Battle on Infantry DEFENDER ( [(0,0)-
(7,1.5)],(1,0.5),(2,0.7),(3,1),(4,1.3),(5,1.4),(6,0.7) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(366) Table for the Effect of Battle Type on FMR1 ( [(0,0)-
(7,15)],(1,5),(2,9),(3,12.5),(4,12),(5,10),(6,5) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Multiplier to multiply against (DLR/ALR) 
 
(368) Targeting Switch = IF THEN ELSE ( Cummulative Air Strikes against BPD > ( ISIS Oil 
Production before Attacks / Effect of Strike on BPD ) , 0, 1)  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(377) Time Passing = 1 
 Units: Days/Period 
  
(382) Time to Recognize Battle = 1 
 Units: Period 
  
(383) "Time to Repair & Operate" = 1 
 Units: Period 
  
(391) Type of Battle = ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" * "ZScernario1: Table for Battle Type based on 
Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
                ) )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(392) Type of Terrain = ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" * "ZScernario1: Table for the Terrain Type 
Vased on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
                ) )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(394) US Airpower Support Step Height = 0 
 Units: Dmnl 
 1 is normal. 1.01 is minimal, 1.10 is significant and 1.5 is intensive. 
 
(395) USEquipmentModifier = 0.25 
 Units: Dmnl/Assets 
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Resistance & Uprising Sector 
 
Normal Garrison
Requirement per Cohort
Militant Police per
Cohort
KIA Per Million
Population
Controlled
Cohorts
Governed Cohorts
Size of Cohort
Table f/ Local vs Foreign
Forces on Force Multiplier
Local Forces Density
Force Multiplier
Table f/ KIA perM on
Force Multiplier
KIA perM Force
Multiplier
Actual Garrison
per Cohort
Garrison Troops
Required
Police Forces
Required
Desired Garrison &
Police Forces
Disable Garrison
Troops
<Rate of Deaths
(People/Period)>
<Population
(People)>
<Local vs Foreign
Forces>
<Population
Controlled Only>
<Population Governed
through Legitimacy
(People)>
Max Garrison
Allocation
Actual Garrison
Delta between Desired
& Actual Garrison
<ISIS Militants
(People)>
Ratio of Delta to
Militants Table for Effect of
Ratio on Uprising
Local Oppo
sition Fighte
rs (People)
Rate of Local
Opposition Fighters
Joining UprisingTime for Uprising
to Form
<Current Territor
y Recruitable Po
pulation>
Effect of Ungarrision
Ratio on Recruiting Rate
Effect of Uprising Militants
on Max Garrison Allocation
Rate of Local
Fighter Deaths
<Opposition Fighter
Losses>
Million Population
LOCAL
RESISTANCE &
UPRISING
Blue Force
FightersIncrease in Blue
Force Fighters
Rate of Blue Force
Deaths
<Blue Infantry
Engaged>
Time for Fighters to
Activate
<Opposition Fighter
Losses>
Starting Blue Force
Fighters Actively
Opopsing ISIS
<Population Controlled by
Coercive Power (People)>
% of Controlled that will
Join Opposition Forces
Cumm Blue
Force
FightersIncrease in Cumm
Blue Force Fighters
Cumm
Opposition
DeathsIncrease in Cumm
Opposition Deaths
Cumm Blue
Force
Deaths
Increase in Cumm
Blue Force Deaths
<Blue Infantry
Actual Losses>
Diehards joining
Uprising
 
 
© Tim Clancy MAR 2015                               Contact: timothy.clancy.nv@gmail.com 126 
Resistance & Uprising Sector Equations 
(013) "% of Controlled that will Join Opposition Forces" = 0.001 
 Units: Percentage/Period 
 Diehard opposition will fight against ISIS regardless of state of Garrison. This may also account for tribal rivalries. Should be  
   approximately 1,000 per 1m controlled pop. 
 
(019) Actual Garrison = MIN ( "Desired Garrison & Police Forces" , Max Garrison Allocation )  
 Units: People 
  
(020) Actual Garrison per Cohort = Normal Garrison Requirement per Cohort * Local Forces Density Force Multiplier * KIA perM 
Force Multiplier  
 Units: People/Cohort 
  
(052) Blue Force Fighters = INTEG( Increase in Blue Force Fighters - Rate of Blue Force Deaths , Starting Blue Force Fighters 
Actively Opopsing ISIS )  
 Units: People 
  
(060) Blue Infantry Actual Losses = Blue Infantry Final Losses - Opposition Fighter Losses  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(061) Blue Infantry Engaged = "ZScenario1: Table of Blue Infantry Engaged based on Location of ISIS on Territorial Map" 
( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
           )  
 Units: People 
  
(062) Blue Infantry Final Losses = Blue Infantry Initial Losses * Blue Infantry Recovery  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(075) Controlled Cohorts = Population Controlled Only / Size of Cohort  
 Units: Cohort 
  
(079) Cumm Blue Force Deaths = INTEG( Increase in Cumm Blue Force Deaths , 0)  
 Units: People 
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(080) Cumm Blue Force Fighters = INTEG( Increase in Cumm Blue Force Fighters , Starting Blue Force Fighters Actively 
Opopsing ISIS )  
 Units: People 
  
(081) Cumm Opposition Deaths = INTEG( Increase in Cumm Opposition Deaths , 0)  
 Units: People 
  
(085) Current Territory Recruitable Population = "ZScenario1: Table for Cumm Total Recruitable Population based on Location of 
ISIS on Map" ( Current Location of ISIS on Territorial Map 
           )  
 Units: People 
  
(097) "Delta between Desired & Actual Garrison" = "Desired Garrison & Police Forces" - Actual Garrison  
 Units: People 
  
(102) "Desired Garrison & Police Forces" = ( Garrison Troops Required + Police Forces Required ) * Disable Garrison Troops  
 Units: People 
  
(107) Diehards joining Uprising = "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" * "% of Controlled that will Join Opposition 
Forces"  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(109) Disable Garrison Troops = 1 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(122) Effect of Ungarrision Ratio on Recruiting Rate = Table for Effect of Ratio on Uprising ( Ratio of Delta to Militants )  
 Units: Fraction 
 This determines the what % of the population will join the die-hard opposition as ISIS is unable to garrison effectively. 
 
(123) Effect of Uprising Militants on Max Garrison Allocation ( [(0,0)-
(50000,2)],(0,0.5),(10000,0.75),(20000,0.8),(30000,0.9),(40000,0.95),(50000,1) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(146) Garrison Troops Required = Controlled Cohorts * Actual Garrison per Cohort  
 Units: People 
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(147) Governed Cohorts = "Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)" / Size of Cohort  
 Units: Cohort 
  
(158) Increase in Blue Force Fighters = Blue Infantry Engaged / Time for Fighters to Activate  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(159) Increase in Cumm Blue Force Deaths = Rate of Blue Force Deaths  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(160) Increase in Cumm Blue Force Fighters = Increase in Blue Force Fighters  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(161) Increase in Cumm Opposition Deaths = Rate of Local Fighter Deaths  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(178) "ISIS Militants (People)" = INTEG( "Additions (People per Period)" - "Lossess (People per Period)" , ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 
= On)" * ZScenario1 Starting Militants 
                ) )  
 Units: People 
 Scenario Determines starting value. 
 
(183) KIA Per Million Population = "Rate of Deaths (People/Period)" / ( "Population (People)" / Million Population )  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(184) KIA perM Force Multiplier = "Table f/ KIA perM on Force Multiplier" ( KIA Per Million Population )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(187) Local Forces Density Force Multiplier = "Table f/ Local vs Foreign Forces on Force Multiplier" ( Local vs Foreign Forces )  
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(188) "Local Opposition Fighters (People)" = INTEG( Rate of Local Opposition Fighters Joining Uprising - Rate of Local Fighter 
Deaths , 0)  
 Units: People 
  
(199) Local vs Foreign Forces = ZIDZ ( Total Recruited , ( Total Recruited + "Total Foreign Recruits (People)" ) )  
 Units: Percentage 
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(207) Max Garrison Allocation = "ISIS Militants (People)" * Effect of Uprising Militants on Max Garrison Allocation ( "Local 
Opposition Fighters (People)" 
                )  
 Units: People 
  
(210) Militant Police per Cohort = 2.8 
 Units: People/Cohort 
  
(220) Million Population = 1e+006 
 Units: People 
  
(225) Normal Garrison Requirement per Cohort = 8 
 Units: People/Cohort 
  
(233) Opposition Fighter Losses = Blue Infantry Final Losses * "% of Blue Infantry that are Local Opposition Fighters"  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(243) Police Forces Required = Governed Cohorts * Militant Police per Cohort  
 Units: People 
  
(245) "Population (People)" = INTEG( "Births & Immigration (People/Period)" - "Deaths, Recruiting & Emmigration 
(People/Period)" , Initial Population  
           )  
 Units: People 
 Combined population of all Syrian and Iraqi Provinces. “Provinces of Syria”, Administrative Divisions of Countries, Statoids, 
last  
   modified September 22, 2004, accessed September 19th, 2014, http://www.statoids.com/usy.html. “Provinces of 
Iraq”, Administrative  
   Divisions of Countries, Statoids, last modified March 16, 2014, accessed September 19th, 2014, 
http://www.statoids.com/uiq.html. 
 
(246) "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" = INTEG( "Gain in Control (People/Period)" - "Loss of Control 
(People/Period)" , ( "Scenario 1 Switch (1 = On)" 
           * "ZScenario1: Starting Population Controlled" ) )  
 Units: People 
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(248) Population Controlled Only = "Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" - "Population Governed through 
Legitimacy (People)"  
 Units: People 
  
(250) "Population Governed through Legitimacy (People)" = INTEG( "Rate of Transition to Governance (People/Period)" - "Rate of 
Loss of Governance (People/Period)" 
                , 0)  
 Units: People 
  
(258) Rate of Blue Force Deaths = Blue Infantry Actual Losses  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(262) "Rate of Deaths (People/Period)" = "Deaths (People/Period)"  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(266) Rate of Local Fighter Deaths = Opposition Fighter Losses  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(267) Rate of Local Opposition Fighters Joining Uprising = Diehards joining Uprising + ( Effect of Ungarrision Ratio on Recruiting 
Rate * Current Territory Recruitable Population 
                ) / Time for Uprising to Form  
 Units: People/Period 
  
(273) Ratio of Delta to Militants = "Delta between Desired & Actual Garrison" / "ISIS Militants (People)"  
 Units: Fraction 
  
(331) Size of Cohort = 1000 
 Units: People/Cohort 
  
(333) Starting Blue Force Fighters Actively Opopsing ISIS = 10000 
 Units: People 
  
(342) "Table f/ KIA perM on Force Multiplier" ( [(0,0)-(460,3)],(28,1),(50,1.23),(67,1.36),(120,1.67),(298,2.36),(460,2.8) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
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(343) "Table f/ Local vs Foreign Forces on Force Multiplier" ( [(0,0)-(1,3)],(0.1,2.38),(0.65,1.14),(1,1) ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(352) Table for Effect of Ratio on Uprising ( [(0,0)-(1.5,0.15)],(0,0),(0.5,0.01),(0.75,0.02),(0.8,0.03),(1,0.05),(1.2,0.1) ) 
 Units: Fraction 
  
(373) Time for Fighters to Activate = 1 
 Units: Period 
  
(376) Time for Uprising to Form = 1 
 Units: Period 
 
